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Comments |
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 | Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 12:52:24 mst
Comment ID: #1
Name: Lemuel
E-mail: synthesist(at)ymail.com
Hey, Diana, I heard a great alternative to "good luck" the other night.
The protagonist on 'Lie to Me' helped a colleague out of a really complex jam, which culminated in the friend testifying at a high-profile trial instead of facing prison himself. After everything settled down, right as the friend walked into the court room, the protagonist said "Get it done." It wasn't issued as an order, like a manager to a subordinate, but projected in a tone of utmost confidence and support, a recognition that the friend was fully prepared.
I agree that "Good luck" diminishes the importance of the effort another has put into a task. Although I don't remember them all, many of the alternatives suggested to you in your comments were frankly kind of hokey. I can't imagine any response but an awkward "o-kay ..." to something like "Good premises!", even when speaking to someone who gets it. It's just too weird, and can even be distracting. One doesn't have to say anything, but when compelled to, a common colloquialism rather than something deep and enriched with meaning is welcome, and can dissipate nervousness.
One can vary that phrasing, but I think it's perfect as is if spoken in the right tone -- "Get it done." "Finish it." etc. -- IF one refrains from the more reflexive verbal diarrhea cliches like "Git 'er done" (is the person you're speaking to about to change the oil in a tractor?), and especially "(Let's) go *do* this (thing)", which should be punished by throwing wet food at whoever says it. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 14:43:52 mst
Comment ID: #2
Name: Francis Luong (Franco)
E-mail: dispensable(at)definefunk.com
URL: http://justaddrationality.blogspot.com/
More options:
Kick some ass.
Own it.
Walk in like you own the place.
Give it your best. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 15:33:59 mst
Comment ID: #3
Name: Galileo Blogs
E-mail: rayniles(at)rcniles.com
URL: http://galileoblogs.blogspot.com
The Koreans always say the equivalent of "Work hard." That is their standard way of saying goodbye to each other. Impressive, and a partial explanation for the ascent of that country since the Korean War. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 15:35:39 mst
Comment ID: #4
Name: Mel McGuire
I just sent this email to my senator:
"Senator Feinstein,
President Obama has said that the Fort Hood killings are "incomprehensible". I'm astonished and appalled that this sort of pop drivel would be supported by a president of the U.S. But worse, it's toxic in that "incomprehensible" is absolutely the worst way to leave the matter. It's ominous that CNN picked this up within hours and turned it into a headline. Anyway, there is danger in ignorance and evasion and I insist that a full investigation be made.
Thank you," |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 17:12:03 mst
Comment ID: #5
Name: C Andrew
E-mail: ca4papen(at)mindspring.com
From Walter Williams:
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705343591/Both-Demos-and-Republi ...
At Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Oct. 29 press conference, a CNS News reporter asked, "Madam Speaker, where specifically does the Constitution grant Congress the authority to enact an individual health insurance mandate?" Speaker Pelosi responded, "Are you serious? Are you serious?" The reporter said, "Yes, yes, I am." Not responding further, Pelosi shook her head and took a question from another reporter. Later on, Pelosi's press spokesman Nadeam Elshami told CNSNews.com about its question regarding constitutional authority mandating that individual Americans buy health insurance. "You can put this on the record. That is not a serious question. That is not a serious question." |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 17:18:52 mst
Comment ID: #6
Name: C Andrew
E-mail: ca4papen(at)mindspring.com
Mr. McGuire,
I find their incomprehension incomprehensible as well.
If a man jumped up on a desk, shouted "Sieg Heil!" and begin shooting Jews I think we could make a fair approximation of what his motivation was.
Yet today, If a man jumps up on a desk, Shouts "Allahu Akbar!" and starts shooting American Soldiers, the news media and the ruling party, and the president are completely in the dark as to what his motivations might be and start cautioning us that we should not jump to (patently obvious) conclusions.
In World War II, no politician or media person's career could have survived such a public display of ass-hattery. That they can today speaks volumes about the present culture. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 18:50:06 mst
Comment ID: #7
Name: Alex G.
I have a question about emotions. Objectivism argues that emotions are ultimately the product of value judgements, but those influenced by evolutionary science will say that emotions are "hard wired" into us from eons of evolutionary history. Thus our emotional responses are not optional in many cases and this, they tell us, leads to the conclusion that humans are biologically determined machines.
Many evolutionary psychologists are constantly writing about how human mate selection is largely driven by evolutionarily determined drives and that free-will plays little if any role. Could it ever be the case that emotions are not the response to human value judgments but the automatic response to millions of years of evolution and that what we feel today is the result of what Grok felt a hundred thousand years ago and the fact that he lived to reproduce? Could evolutionary science pose any challenge to the Objectivist theory of human emotions (or Objectivism in general)?
A number of people I know think that evolutionary science has already invalidated Objectivism because they say human beings are not "blank slate" and are in fact heavily determined by genetic factors. Further they say, that humans get alot of information and knowledge from genes and that genes control much of human behavior. (Can genes give us conceptual knowledge? I can't see how that would be possible.) Generally speaking, the more science oriented a person is, the less they believe in free will, at least what Objectivsts mean by free will. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 22:22:52 mst
Comment ID: #8
Name: Dan G.
Alex G.,
The short answer is that there is NO science behind EvPsych, nothing but assertions and attempts to rationalize wanton behavior. Further, their claims about Objectivism and blank slate take Objectivism's claim out of context. It is in terms of knowledge and concepts that the blank slate applies. The mechanisms for emotions are "hard wired", but the triggers are not. Grok, as you put it, didn't have sneakers or an automobile, let alone an insane reaction to someone accidentally scuffing or dinging them.
"Could it ever be the case that emotions are not the response to human value judgments but the *automatic response* to millions of years of evolution and that what we feel today is the result of what Grok felt a hundred thousand years ago and the fact that he lived to reproduce?"
Response, what kind of response? More clearly, not all responses to stimuli are emotions. I would agree that there could be some responses that have an evolutionary basis, the senses for one are responses, but I might even buy that higher level responses particularly those based on sexual attractiveness (body shape, complexion, gender, etc...), but I wouldn't consider such responses emotional; more of a binary "hot or not". Personally, I could see that a woman is attractive (possible evolutionary mechanism), but be completely put-off/disgusted when she opened her mouth and said something stupid (emotional response).
If the emotional reactions were genetically based, then what gives rise the spectrum of emotional responses, especially the variety of responses that can even come from the same genetic lineage? I definitely do not have the same emotional responses to the same stimuli as my siblings; nor do my father and uncle (identical twins) have the same emotional responses to the same triggers.
Additionally, how would EvPsych reconcile this with the persistence of homosexuality? If value judgments of sexual partners were genetic, then genetic dead-ends like homosexuality would have vanished eons ago. That is, a gene programmed to emotionally/sexually respond positively to a situation that led to its ceasing to be, wouldn't persist.
If EvPsych was a science, this is the type of work they'd be doing: they'd be comparing those with the same DNA and determining which chromosomes a particular response to a particular stimuli correlated to. Instead, they've conducted a survey that didn't exactly define what love was, nor follow up on any of the questions which left a bit of ambiguity (i.e. women who answered that they had sex to keep the man around... Why?... because they love them, maybe?). They'd also stop anthropomorphizing genes.
The actual science (where the rubber meets the road) of value judgments, memory, etc... is more likely based on epigenetics. It has been demonstrated, in rats at least, that maternal care for offspring can lead to different responses to stress, with neglected pups being quicker to panic in a stressful situation. This behavior was even communicated via cross-fostering, meaning that the pups of "good" mothers pick up the increased panic during stress and vice a versa. Recently, a difference in the methylation of state of the gene coding for a hormone receptor that is central to this stress response (HPA response, glucocorticoid receptor gene) are decidedly different in the hippocampi of the two groups, and the difference serves as a switch, either allowing or preventing the binding of a growth factor. The difference in the methylation state can be modified with treatments, and the behavior can be reversed/induced along with the modification.
For those interested, here's a paper: (http://champagnelab.psych.columbia.edu/docs/champ14.pdf), but this group has others as well (particularly M. Szyf). |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 23:09:59 mst
Comment ID: #9
Name: Jeff Montgomery
E-mail: jamontgom(at)hotmail.com
URL: http://funwithgravity.blogspot.com/
Alex,
First, I wonder what evolutionary scientists mean by "hard wired". Are Grok's emotions resurfacing when I write a good computer program and feel satisfaction? How did Grok know C#?
"Blank slate" can be a pretty vague term. I believe Ayn Rand was only referring to concept-formation. I'm certainly not going to take most critics' word that they understand Objectivism correctly, since they are usually wrong.
There are emotions on the one hand, and sensations such as pleasure and pain, over which we have no control, on the other. Certainly, we have pleasurable responses to evolutionary positives and painful responses to evolutionary negatives. Ayn Rand even stated that.
Regarding emotion, since reason evolved just like our senses did, it seems plausible to me that the degree of an emotional response triggered by a conceptual value judgment might be enhanced by evolution. That is, *once we understand* that we are dealing with a baby, or a romantic relationship, or food, or an attractive mate, whatever may have evolutionary import, our response may be greater than it would be for some other, less evolutionarily relevant thing. Reason is a natural biological capability like any other. However, what is *not* evolutionary is that we have to work at the task of forming that knowledge.
That's my own opinion, by the way, and those better versed in Objectivism's position might not agree.
Anyway, to say that evolution influences cognition would not even make any sense. Awareness is awareness. I see the world; I grasp it conceptually. It's me and the world. There is only one way to grasp reality, and that is to grasp IT. Any other view is simply subjectivism, and is not valid.
And none of these things have any impact on volition. As Ayn Rand said, volition is ultimately our ability to focus mentally. Emotions can certainly make it easier or harder to decide something, but they cannot decisively determine our judgment. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 23:34:45 mst
Comment ID: #10
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/
Dan: Your specific statement that "If value judgments of sexual partners were genetic, then genetic dead-ends like homosexuality would have vanished eons ago" is based on an oversimple theory of genetic fitness. Genes have ways of increasing their representation in a population other than by encouraging procreation in their carriers. If this were not so, the social insects could not have evolved: for worker termites, ants, and bees do not procreate, and whatever genes code specifically for their sterility, or for the behavior of their castes, are not being passed on to their offspring.
Rather, a gene in one individual can be represented in the next generation either by that individual procreating, or by that individual's sibling or other close kin procreating. An individual that finds rewarding (via pleasure/pain) behavior that enables its close kin to have much increased reproductive success will raise the inclusive fitness of the genes that it shares with them, quite as much as if it procreated itself. So genes that prevent or limit reproduction in specific individuals can be passed on from related individuals who also carry those genes.
That's not to say that human homosexuality is such a trait. We don't have conclusive evidence on that. Such evidence as we do have paints a more complicated picture. For example, in many tribal societies, customs ensure that effectively everyone marries, and consummates the marriage; and if you are a woman who prefers other women, or a man who prefers other men (so long as this preference is not so strong as to make physical arousal with a woman impossible), you will still pass on your genes, and the selective pressure against genetic tendencies to homosexuality is low. That was still true in American society 50 years ago, when many gays and lesbians married, and pursued their preferred sexual relationships secretly; gay liberation has very likely made it much easier for gays and lesbians to find partners of the sex they prefer, and avoid the detour of unsatisfactory marriage, and thus reduced their fertility and lowered the part of their fitness that is due to procreation. Conversely, conceivably tribal customs that get everyone married, regardless of personal inclination, might have lessened the impact of sexual preference on differential fertility and thus encouraged the emergence of genes favorable to homosexuality!
And all this, too, is speculation. The basic point is that evolutionary genetics is complex and subtle, and doesn't always work in the obvious way. |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 23:36:09 mst
Comment ID: #11
Name: Wayne
For a closing remark, I like "work hard" better than "take it easy." |
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| Wednesday, November 11, 2009 at 23:46:38 mst
Comment ID: #12
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/
Jeff: You say that "to say that evolution influences cognition would not even make any sense." I don't see how that can be right. At least, if by "cognition" you mean all awareness of what exists, including sensation and perception. Or do you mean "conceptual thought" or "reason" when you say "cognition"?
I can detect photons; many organisms (for example, cave dwelling species) cannot. On the other hand, I can't detect ultrasonic frequencies, as a bat can, or electric fields, like a platypus.
When I detect photons, I can judge their approximate frequency; and I see them as having three primary colors, because I have three visual pigments. Many organisms don't have color vision, and see only light and dark; on the other hand, some have more than three visual pigments (including, apparently, a few rare humans) and can make color distinctions I can't.
And moving from sensation to perception, I can pick up an object in my hand and form a fairly precise idea of its shape; I can even feel in my pocket for quarters and reject dimes and nickels. Octopodes cannot do that when they grasp things in their tentacles, for a fairly complex neurological reason; the central ganglion, the "brain," does not get that information from the ganglia that control the tentacles.
What we build on the "ground" of perception is our own work (though we use tools, such as words, largely acquired from other people). But that "ground" itself, and the sensory integration that lies beneath it, of which we are not conscious ordinarily, gives every indication of being shaped by evolution, all the way back to the physical facts about what our sense organs can and can't detect. Was that something you meant to deny? Or did you have the narrower meaning of "cognition" in mind? |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 6:45:48 mst
Comment ID: #13
Name: KPO'M
E-mail: ka84796(at)comcast.net
Here's another mainstream media article about the "mainstreaming" of Ayn Rand.
http://www.politico.com/click/stories/0911/rand_goes_mainstream.html |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 16:06:12 mst
Comment ID: #14
Name: Larry
One could argue that the hostility exhibited by some avowed "students of Objectivism" towards "EB" and "EP" seems related, or similar in nature, to the hostility exhibited towards quantum physics by other (or perhaps the same)avowed "students of Objectivism".
Not true of all such folks; Stoddard's response seems quite reasoned. Just an observation. |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 16:40:53 mst
Comment ID: #15
Name: Andrew Dalton
E-mail: andrew.s.dalton(at)gmail.com
URL: http://witchdoctorrepellent.blogspot.com
Larry -
It depends on what you mean by "hostility," and it also depends on what they are criticizing (and why). |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 18:47:07 mst
Comment ID: #16
Name: Larry
Some possible issues to discuss:
1). EB posits a near universal desire for status. Objectivism derides this as "social metaphysics".
2) EB posits "kin selection" as an important determinant of animal behavior (including that of humans). Binswanger states (roughly) that "blood ties don't bind". The question here is: does the selfish gene trump the Objectivist conception of rational self interest? |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 21:23:28 mst
Comment ID: #17
Name: Jeff Montgomery
E-mail: jamontgom(at)hotmail.com
URL: http://funwithgravity.blogspot.com/
William H Stoddard:
I meant to say that while the mental *capabilities* of our body (sensation, perception, emotion, and rational faculty) are inevitably the product of evolution, the act of cognition, and the content of awareness itself is not, in the sense that we grasp reality, rather than what evolution somehow "tells" us is out there.
My main intent was to oppose the notion that evolutionary adaptations prevent objectivity by unconsciously causing certain ideas, or whatever the claim may be.
I was also suggesting that it is likely that our emotional response could have been tweaked by evolution to cause us to respond more positively to certain things, once we have identified them and accepted them as values using our rational faculty. Even a stronger response to positive things might have evolutionary value, and therefore been reinforced by natural selection. It is this premise that I meant to distinguish from Objectivism simply because it's my thinking aloud more than anything, rather than a statement of philosophical principle. |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 21:41:45 mst
Comment ID: #18
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/
Larry: You should note that though I am, in the exact, literal sense of the words, a "student of Objectivism," I am not, as those word commonly connote, an adherent of all the positions of Objectivism as defined in its authorized publications. I may sound like one because I have no interest in disparaging Ayn Rand's ideas overall, and in fact I think there is tremendous value in her philosophy (both its positions and its method of reaching them), and because I'm not here to dispute for the sake of disputing; I'm more interested, on one hand, on the large common ground between my own views and Objectivism, and particularly between my own version of classical liberal/libertarian political philosophy and Objectivism, and on the other, in asking occasional questions when I don't think I understand the Objectivist view fully and hope to have it clarified. But in what I say I speak for myself. Others here are much more able to speak about the Objectivist views of your questions.
Though I will say that my experience has been that if you treat Ayn Rand and adherents of her ideas with respect, and ask honest questions, you will be treated with respect here. I encourage you to continue doing likewise. |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 22:26:50 mst
Comment ID: #19
Name: Dan G.
William,
I don't support the statement you quoted, it was a prediction based on taking EvPsych at face value (i.e. if sexual choices/emotions were genetic, as they claim).
I do not believe that homosexuality is genetic (i.e. pertaining only to the primary sequence of DNA). I'll gather my thoughts and a few facts about your ant example and try to continue this discussion in another open thread (no promises that I'll be ready by the next one). |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 22:46:30 mst
Comment ID: #20
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/
Dan: I didn't think you supported that statement. Rather, I took it that you were saying "A implies B; but B is false; so A must be false". . . where A is "homosexuality is genetic." And I was saying that "A implies B" isn't required to be true by the logic of evolutionary genetics, and thus the falsity of B doesn't require the falsity of A.
I don't claim to know the causation of homosexuality. I believe that sexual object choice is usually established before the age when conceptual thought begins; that is, being homosexual or heterosexual isn't a "choice" in the ethical sense and isn't subject to ethical judgment. But that could be true without genetic causation. All that I'm saying is that I don't believe enough is currently known to rule out genetic causation as a possibility. I'm willing to be shown otherwise by further evidence. It's not a matter of great importance to me, because I don't attach moral significance to heterosexuality or homosexuality. |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 22:46:34 mst
Comment ID: #21
Name: Dan G.
Larry,
I don't think hostility is the appropriate word, critical is more accurate; speaking for myself, of course. All of the discipline's you've mentioned share one characteristic, they make a model, then try to see if it fits reality instead of observing reality first, then making theories. Could they be correct? Yes, but they're also risking aliasing errors. For instance (and I'm just starting out with this one, and reading recommendations are welcomed), Einstein predicted "gravity lensing" effects and used an eclipse of the sun to demonstrate that his theory was correct. However, predicting an effect is not the same as demonstrating a cause. I'm curious as to how the recent validation of water on the moon will play out. Where there's water, there's water vapor; and water vapor can form an atmosphere (albeit not as roboust as the Earth's). This potential for a water vapor atmosphere carries with it another explanation for the bending of light, refraction through the water vapor.
Similarly, with EP/EB, they might accurately state facts or can make predictions, that doesn't mean they've nailed the mechanism down. Emotions are not genetic. A completely unethical experiment in the past did a pretty good job of demonstrating this with the emotion of fear (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Albert_experiment). Are the mechanics of fear the same, yes. But the stimuli triggering them are acquired. So, tying it back to sexual emotions; the mechanism for an erection has a genetic basis, but the individual/entity (allowing for fetishists) giving rise to it (pun completely intended), are acquired. |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 22:59:09 mst
Comment ID: #22
Name: Dan G.
William:
I'll try to have a more thorough discussion later (when I've read a bit more on the ant issue), but there is something wrong your example.
I agree with your entire 2nd paragraph. My interest is strictly scientific, not in moral judgments of it. I'm a Ph.D. candidate with epigenetics as a significant focus of my project and the nature of sexual orientation smacks of epigenetics (i.e. it is a stable, but non-heritable trait). |
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| Thursday, November 12, 2009 at 23:39:12 mst
Comment ID: #23
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/
Dan: I will be glad to see what you have to say, from a basis of scientific knowledge much more substantial than mine. |
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| Friday, November 13, 2009 at 1:59:53 mst
Comment ID: #24
Name: Charlie
Alex G.,
I think the critical thing you are misunderstanding - which has been alluded to by others, but which I want to state succinctly and explicitly - is that you need to untangle the "hard wired" pain-pleasure mechanism from all of the emotions that resemble it. It is certainly true that humans, like all animals, have automatic, unalterable drives which pull them away from certain painful things and towards certain pleasurable things. However, those drives are not nearly as often the animating factor in human behavior that the promoters of EvPsych believe them to be. They are ever present, yes, but they are not paramount.
I'm sure we can both agree that humans, uniquely, have the ability to override those drives. Most often, in more common, non-life-defining situations, this is the result of intellectual conviction. Because of some conceptual knowledge we have about the nature of something, we can deliberately induce (as opposed to automatically avoid) pain for the sake of some longer-ranger goal; just as we can deliberately avoid (as opposed to automatically seek) pleasure, also for the sake of some longer-ranger goal.
However, when this isn't the case (eg: when our "hard wired" drive to seek pleasure coincides with our intellectual conviction that we should seek out this particular source of pleasure because it's a winning investment), that is when emotions come into the picture. Just as it is possible that the drive can be overriden if the conviction to do the opposite is strong enough, it is possible that the drive will not be sufficient to induce us to act upon it even if the conviction is synchronized with the drive (particularly if the conviction is new). An additional, unique source of motivation is needed.
That is the role of emotions. An emotion is a *conditioned* response to an intellectual conviction - *reinforced* (eventually) by one of the two drives - but first and foremost it is a confirmation of a conviction. Specifically, it is a momentary, premature experience of what it would be like if what that conviction describes were achieved.
For example, if a person is trying to build muscular strength, he intentionally subjects himself to the painful experience of lifting weights because he is convinced that doing so will give him the increased strength he seeks. Eventually, assuming his understanding of how to achieve his goal is correct, the result of his actions will be a greater capacity for the indulgence in pleasure (eg: performing better in an athletic competition, having more energy to do everyday things because his metabolism has improved, attracting a better looking woman and/or having better sex, whatever).
Whatever his purpose for achieving the increased strength, the pleasure he recieved once he reached it was increased because of his fidelity to his conceptual knowledge. Of course, had he not increased his muscular strength, he still would have been physiologically capable of doing any of the activities I gave as examples, and he still would have been drawn to them naturally because they are "hard wired" sources of pleasure, but he wouldn't have been able to do them as well. He wouldn't have received *as much* pleasure from them; and he knew this going in. Without emotions, he would not be able to maintain his fidelity to his conceptual knowledge in the face of "hard wired" drives urging to abandon it. Unlike the lower animals, human beings are not moved simply by their escape from pain and their pull towards pleasure. To an animal, these drives are ever present. To a human, because we have the capacity to realize that these drives can be misleading (ie: lead us to less than optimal results in a constantly changing environment), they are rarely enough to compel us to act. Providing an incentive for achieving that difference - that increased capacity for pleasure - I submit, is one of the two function of emotions. The other is to enhance the reward.
In addition to the increased pleasure, we more often than not require that meaning be attached to our actions (ie: emotional significance). So, to continue with my example, in order for a man to fully appreciate the value of his increased muscular strength, he must not only enjoy the increased physiological pleasure that comes with it, he must also be able to think of the experience - as it is happening - as a testament to the *thinking and imagining* he had to perform in order to reach that new, elevated, previously only imagined state of existence. That extra, psychic, bit of pleasure has nothing to do with "hard wired" drives. It is pure emotion. |
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| Friday, November 13, 2009 at 11:22:46 mst
Comment ID: #25
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/
Megan McArdle posts (http://meganmcardle.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/11/landmark_emine ...) that the city of New London has not realized the expected payoffs from the Kelo property seizure; the incoming mayor summed it up as "Basically, our economy lost a thousand jobs, but we still have a building." McArdle describes this outcome as a tragedy. I can't share her sentiments; learning that the city's ill-gotten gains have turned into ill-gotten losses gives me a pleasant sense of seeing justice done. |
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| Friday, November 13, 2009 at 14:17:47 mst
Comment ID: #26
Name: Alex G.
I want to thank all of the people who responded. This is a difficult subject and some good information was given. BTW, Larry pretty much sums up the responses that I have received towards Objectivism from EvPsych people; namely that it ignores the reality of "Kin selection" as the basis of morality and the reality of the "selfish gene". Both of these things are asserted to discredit Objectivism. I don't believe this but at this point I am not ready to debate an EP person. |
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| Friday, November 13, 2009 at 15:18:54 mst
Comment ID: #27
Name: Andrew Dalton
E-mail: andrew.s.dalton(at)gmail.com
URL: http://witchdoctorrepellent.blogspot.com
Alex -
A crucial thing to understand is that it is a violation of the proper conceptual hierarchy for anyone to speak of "discrediting" a philosophy by use of one of the special sciences. Philosophy comes first; it sets the broad terms under which the sciences operate. (The limitation of philosophy is that it cannot answer narrow questions about the specific nature of entities or natural laws; that is where science takes over.)
For example, whatever metaphorical usefulness the idea of a "selfish gene" may have in its context, we can know from philosophical principles that it is a grave error to carry this notion into the field of ethics. Ethics deals with choices that people make. Genes don't make choices; they simply act according to the laws of biochemistry, with their distributions in a population governed by natural selection. A gene simply cannot be "selfish" or "altruistic" in the relevant sense that a person can be.
(The same warning goes for trying to _prove_ a philosophical principle through science -- such as defending the validity of the senses on the argument that natural selection would favor it. The problem here is that science depends on evidence that is reducible to sense data, so we must already accept the validity of the senses in order to make use of the theory of natural selection or any other scientific idea.) |
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| Sunday, November 15, 2009 at 19:37:03 mst
Comment ID: #28
Name: larry
Andrew,
You argue that it is impossible for the study af animal behavior (including that of humans) to have implications regarding ethics -- the "special science" vs. primacy of philosophy argument. The problem with this argument is that the latter makes assumptions regarding human nature that the former may invalidate. |
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| Sunday, November 15, 2009 at 20:32:26 mst
Comment ID: #29
Name: Andrew Dalton
E-mail: andrew.s.dalton(at)gmail.com
URL: http://witchdoctorrepellent.blogspot.com
Larry,
First, I wrote that the study of *genes* as such (not animal behavior) cannot be generalized to ethics. This fact is a consequence of what the field of ethics means, and yes, such a conclusion is prior to any claim that can be made from the specialized sciences. Since ethics is the normative field of philosophy dealing with human choices, biochemistry is not -- and never will be -- part of ethics.
But on the subject of human nature, there are also truths that have to be validated prior to any scientific investigation. Most crucially these include reason and volition. If an evolutionary biologist, or whoever, comes to the "conclusion" that people don't really think, or that free will is an illusion, then he is endorsing a contradiction. The reason is that scientific investigation, as a method of genuine knowledge, works only to the extent that people can evaluate evidence and choose between alternatives. If people don't actually think or choose, then scientific conclusions aren't anyone's knowledge of anything; they would be merely verbal squawkings or scratches on paper. |
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| Sunday, November 15, 2009 at 21:17:45 mst
Comment ID: #30
Name: madmax
"The problem with this argument is that the latter makes assumptions regarding human nature that the former may invalidate."
This strikes me as saying that science may one day prove biological determinism. This is a self-refuting position as are all deterministic arguments (environmental, biological, theological).
It never ceases to amaze me how enamored of determinism many in the science fields are. I understand - although I adamantly disagree with - why so many religious conservatives are so opposed to Darwin and evolution. Nearly every evolutionary influenced person they read is telling them that they have no free will, no mind, no consciousness and no capacity for independent moral judgment. If its not the "selfish gene" that determines their behavior then its "memes" or evolutionary "wiring" for selflessness, etc.. It seems like many of today's science oriented thinkers are their own worst enemy. |
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| Monday, November 16, 2009 at 8:13:49 mst
Comment ID: #31
Name: 'Go Thank YourSelf'
E-mail: Iamoura(at)ymail.com
URL: http://www.youtube.com/user/GaltsGulchPortal
Re: Comment 1 (Lemuel) and other suggestions (2, 3, 11):
Paul McKeever (you'll see him occasionally with a contribution to TheObjectivistRoundUp) has an annual Thanksgiving message he spreads 'to those who know' to replace the false bromide of the status quo...
Go Thank yourSelf!
...is his salutation 'to those who know' in order to bring the Thanksgiving Holiday (31/11/104AR) into a HankRearden perspective;
"You know Dagny, Thanksgiving was a holiday established by productive people to celebrate the success of their work."
The movement of his arm, as he raised his glass, went from the portrait - to her - to himself - to the buildings of the city beyond the window."
A nice, intellectually correct touch I say. Hmmm, I'll have to work on recruiting him as we could use a JudgeNarragansett Constitution Converter. He may ready to "stop supporting his destroyers"
I $ I |
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| Monday, November 16, 2009 at 9:52:25 mst
Comment ID: #32
Name: Steve D'Ippolito
*goes out on a limb*
I tend to think that behaviorism, evolutionary psychology, etc., might actually be useful branches of knowlege but not in the sense that many of their practitioners think.
We do indeed have volition and a rational capacity but our animal forebears did not have the rational capacity (they may have had some degree of free will but whether it counts as volition I'll leave for another day; I suspect much hangs on the definition of "volition.") We have the rational capacity but it is not always engaged; it becomes active when we choose to be rational. What do you suppose happens when we do *not* make the choice to be rational? What is there, behaviorally, to default to? *That* is where these sorts of studies might bear fruit. I believe they are studies of *irrational,* *volition abdicated* behavior (and alas those situations are all too common!) and if taken in that light *could* be useful. But any claim by these people that their theories explain *all* human behavior is simply wrong, as pointed out before it doesn't even explain the very human process of deriving the theory. The theories cannot explain their own existence in our minds as concepts, and are therefore at best an only *partial* explanation of human behavior in some contexts. |
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| Monday, November 16, 2009 at 13:05:00 mst
Comment ID: #33
Name: madmax
"What do you suppose happens when we do *not* make the choice to be rational? What is there, behaviorally, to default to? *That* is where these sorts of studies might bear fruit. I believe they are studies of *irrational,* *volition abdicated* behavior (and alas those situations are all too common!) and if taken in that light *could* be useful."
Steve,
This is also exactly what I think about EvPsych and the behavioral sciences. Thank you for articulating it so well. |
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