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Comments |
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 | Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 13:31:29 mst
Comment ID: #1
Name: BrianS
"I don't like honors. ... I don't believe in honors. It bothers me, honors..."
The practice of justice is not something to be disliked, nor is it evidence of second-handedness. In other words, productiveness and justice are *both* rational virtues. Just as it is wrong to spurn productiveness, so too it is wrong to spurn justice. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 16:22:21 mst
Comment ID: #2
Name: Cogito
Feynman reminds me quite a bit of Andy Bernstein. It's quite amusing to imagine one in the other's place. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 16:48:06 mst
Comment ID: #3
Name: Mike Hardy
E-mail: (my last name) (at) math.umn.edu
Maybe the guy in the video was actually Howard Roark and someone mis-typed his name. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 20:08:18 mst
Comment ID: #4
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
Is the granting of an honor synonymous with (or a form of) justice? |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 20:08:32 mst
Comment ID: #5
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
Is the granting of an honor synonymous with (or a form of) justice? |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 20:18:15 mst
Comment ID: #6
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
Mike Hardy: One reason that the Feynman quote struck me was because it brought to mind a couple of passages from The Fountainhead, in Part 4, Chapter 8 when Howard Roark discusses his attitude towards his work.
When Roark discusses with Peter Keating the prospect of designing Cortland, Roark tells Peter:
HR: "You'll get everything society can give a man. You'll keep all the money. You'll take any fame or honor anyone might want to grant. You'll accept such gratitude as the tenants might feel. And I -- I'll take what nobody can give a man, except himself. I will have built Cortlandt."
PK: "You're getting more than I am, Howard."
In the same chapter, Roark also says:
HR: "I like to receive money for my work. But I can pass that up this time. I like to have people know my work is done by me. But I can pass that up. I like to have tenants made happy by my work. But that doesn't matter too much. The only thing that matters, my goal, my reward, my beginning, my end is the work itself. My work done my way..."
(Of course, Feynman was not an Objectivist.) |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 20:44:54 mst
Comment ID: #7
Name: William H Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/profile
I think it's important in considering this whether the award is a primary value or a secondary value.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the megalopsychos, or great-souled man (traditionally, "megalopsychia" is translated as the Latin-derived "magnanimity," but that's taken on rather different meanings through centuries of linguistic evolution, to where it's about as close as the Sanskrit "mahatma"). And among the things he says is that the megalopsychos is only moderately pleased when he is praised by good and wise men, because no praise could be equal to what he knows his true merits to be; but he IS pleased, because there is nothing on earth more worth receiving than such praise. But with praise from small-minded men, or on trivial grounds, he is utterly unconcerned, and blame too.
I've thought for some time that Ayn Rand's portrait of Howard Roark, in particular, could be a textbook case of the megalopsychos. Whereas Peter Keating is a micropsychos: he wants to be praised, desperately, because he has no confidence in his own worth without such praise; he cares nothing for who praises him or why, so long as they praise him; and in the last analysis he will attempt to win praise by blackmail, by using the threat of withholding his own praise to pressure other people into giving him their praiseā"and be shocked and baffled when he encounters someone who is indifferent to his threats or flatteries and cannot be influenced to praise him.
So: If you do good work, and other people praise you, and if you are rationally certain of your own worth and the worth of your work, then you will be pleased with the praise for secondary reasons: to see the worth of your work given concrete form in the favorable responses of other people whom you respect, and to see other people showing the worth of their own judgment by recognizing your accomplishments.
And note that Feynman WAS avowing that sort of pleasure: He said explicitly that seeing other physicists actually USE his work gave him pleasure. What he saw as less worthwhile was having his work praised as a result of a political process. It's rather akin to an epigram JFK supposely used to quote:
Bullfight critics ranked in rows/Crowed the enormous plaza full,/But there is only one who knows - /And he's the man who fights the bull. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 21:43:12 mst
Comment ID: #8
Name: JeremyS
E-mail: jws455(at)gmail.com
That little clip made my evening. After it ended, I clicked and watched "Richard Feynman on Social Sciences" and was treated to Dr. Feynman saying, "I know what it means to know something." Refreshing to hear. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 21:51:40 mst
Comment ID: #9
Name: BrianS
"Is the granting of an honor synonymous with (or a form of) justice?"
Yes. In principle it is the recognition of an individual for something great/outstanding they have done. At minimum, an honor is a 'thank you' granted by individuals who have judged a man's character and/or conduct and think him deserving of their gratitude. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 22:09:13 mst
Comment ID: #10
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
As many know, Al Gore won a Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 for his work on climate change. That is considered a tremendous honor.
However, it would be difficult to argue that this was an act of justice. |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 22:24:27 mst
Comment ID: #11
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
BTW, here's an extended version of the interview in which Feynman provides some additional context for his remarks:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f61KMw5zVhg
The extended segment includes the following:
"When I was in high school, one of the first honors I got was to be a member of the Arista, which is a group of kids who got good grades -- hmm? Everybody wanted to be a member of the Arista. And when I got into the Arista, I discovered that what they did in their meetings was to sit around to discuss who else was [in a lofty tone of voice] worthy to join this wonderful group that we are. Okay? So we sat around trying to decide who it was who would get to be allowed into this Arista. This kind of thing bothers me psychologically for one or another reason I don't understand myself. Honors -- and from that day to this -- always bothered me.
"I had trouble when I became a member of the National Academy of Science, and I had ultimately to resign. Because there was another organization, most of whose time was spent in choosing who was illustrious enough to be allowed to join us in our organization. Including such questions as 'We physicists have to stick together, because there's a very good chemist that they're trying to get in, and we haven't got enough room for so-and-so.' What's the matter with chemists? The whole thing was rotten, because the purpose was mostly to decide who could have this honor. Okay? I don't like honors." |
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| Wednesday, July 15, 2009 at 22:24:55 mst
Comment ID: #12
Name: Diana Hsieh
E-mail: diana(at)dianahsieh.com
URL: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog
BrianS: So giving the Nobel Peace Prize to Yasser Arafat was a form of justice? And all of the accolades heaped on Peter Keating for the Cosmo-Slotnick building were a form of justice? Of course not -- and I'm sure you agree with me on this point! -- the value of honors depends on those who bestow them.
Even honors bestowed by the best of men for genuine accomplishments should be of comparatively little value to the first-handed person: they should not motivate him, nor affect his judgment of his accomplishment, nor be a source of self-esteem. At best, just honors are a concrete symbol of a man's accomplishment, not to be confused with the real value, namely the substance of that accomplishment.
Also, I think that many honors are given in a contrived and meaningless way. I could win a dozen plaques for my dissertation, but all would be mere clutter. It's the hefty bound manuscript that means something to me: that's the concrete symbol of my accomplishment.
Of course, honors can be justly given, appropriately appreciated, and graciously received. In such cases, I think, the giving of the honor reflects more on the honor-giver than the honor-recipient. The honor-giver says to the world, "Here's what I see and what I value." If right and true, the recipient of those honors (and other witnesses) can respect and value the soul who sees and values that. That's the kind of view of gratitude and honors seen in _Atlas Shrugged_, I think. And it's part and parcel of "Judge, and prepare to be judged."
My views on this issue are somewhat nascent -- and a bit scattered above -- so I'm interested in further comments. I'm definitely not opposed to the giving or receiving of honors -- and nor is Paul. I simply don't think they ought to be terribly important to the recipient.
Oh, one more thought: Harry Binswanger has said -- and rightly so, I think -- that if a person had to choose, it would be better to love someone (without being loved back) than to be loved (without loving). The act of loving is a substantial, meaningful act -- whereas merely being loved is not. Similarly, other things being equal, I think it is much better to admire and honor someone than to be admired and honored by someone. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 0:04:04 mst
Comment ID: #13
Name: BrianS
"the value of honors depends on those who bestow them"
Then its a good thing I never suggested otherwise - isn't it?
I said the *principle* of an honor is one of justice. Just as the *principle* of a verdict in a court of law is one of justice. Does that mean ALL verdicts in ANY court system are proper examples of justice? "Of course not -- and I'm sure you agree with me on this point!" :)
"Even honors bestowed by the best of men for genuine accomplishments should be of comparatively little value to the first-handed person"
"I simply don't think they ought to be terribly important to the recipient."
I have to disagree with this assertion completely. Justice - the granting of that which a person deserves - is of great value, especially to a "first-handed person". In fact, to whom else is justice a fundamental virtue except the "first-handed" - ie rational - person?
Justice is not simply the granting of punishment to those who deserve to be punished, but is equally - if not more importantly - in the granting of rewards to those who deserve to be rewarded for their character and/or actions.
Furthermore, as you indicate, the value (or disvalue) of an honor depends upon who bestows them. If some stranger, of whom you have no personal knowledge, honors you for your good work or actions, that can be appreciated, but likely may not be an enormous value. On the other hand, if a loved one or a person *you* admire greatly (say AR) honors you, I would think their recognition of the goodness of your actions would be of appreciable value to you.
"I think that many honors are given in a contrived and meaningless way."
Maybe. But that is not a reason to say, on principle, "I don't like honors" any more than miscarriages of justice are a reason to say, on principle, "I don't like justice".
"I think, the giving of the honor reflects more on the honor-giver than the honor-recipient. The honor-giver says to the world, "Here's what I see and what I value.""
An honor grants to someone what THEY have earned through THEIR actions and/or character. That is the principle OF justice. It is not simply an expression of "I like x" but is "Bob deserves this (praise, admiration, respect, love - whatever) *because* he did x".
Why is it you think justice is a virtue? Why is it important for you to grant to someone that which they deserve - especially in instances when what that someone has done is good?
Why is it "meaningful" to grant justice but not to be granted justice? Why is it important to give but not receive?
--
"Oh, one more thought: Harry Binswanger has said -- and rightly so, I think -- that if a person had to choose, it would be better to love someone (without being loved back) than to be loved (without loving). The act of loving is a substantial, meaningful act -- whereas merely being loved is not."
And what about when you love someone AND are loved back by that person? Are you suggesting you do not consider their act of loving you to be "a substantial, meaningful act"? I certainly consider the love of the person I love to be both meaningful and of great value.
In other words, I think the example is a false alternative and that this comes back to the issue of WHOM it is that is performing the act of justice - ie how much of a value they are to you. Their value to you increases the value of the act of justice they perform, be it an honor or love. (And the reverse is true as well - the disvalue of a given injustice is proportional to the value of a person to you - ie an act of betrayal committed against you by a stranger is not be nearly as bad as the same act of betrayal committed against you by someone you love.) |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 7:15:01 mst
Comment ID: #14
Name: Dana H.
Feynman was absolutely not saying that he was indifferent to others' just recognition of his work. Please re-read the sentence beginning, "I'm appreciated for the work I did..." if you think otherwise. He cared about recognition from fellow working physicists, but not from the Swedish Academy (or NAS). Indifference to honors does not mean indifference to justice.
If a young, bright physicist "honored" Feynman by saying, "I love Feynman diagrams and use them all the time," he would surely be pleased. When Feyman referred to "honors," it should be clear that he meant "formal awards bestowed by committees," not any other meaning of the term. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 7:15:37 mst
Comment ID: #15
Name: Dana H.
Feynman was absolutely not saying that he was indifferent to others' just recognition of his work. Please re-read the sentence beginning, "I'm appreciated for the work I did..." if you think otherwise. He cared about recognition from fellow working physicists, but not from the Swedish Academy (or NAS). Indifference to honors does not mean indifference to justice.
If a young, bright physicist "honored" Feynman by saying, "I love Feynman diagrams and use them all the time," he would surely be pleased. When Feyman referred to "honors," it should be clear that he meant "formal awards bestowed by committees," not any other meaning of the term. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 9:14:11 mst
Comment ID: #16
Name: BrianS
"Indifference to honors does not mean indifference to justice"
A dislike of honors is specifically a dislike of a particular form of justice. Seeing no sense in honors is specifically seeing no sense in a particular form of justice.
"Feynman was absolutely not saying that he was indifferent to others' just recognition of his work."
It is a good thing such an argument was not presented them - isn't it?
Additionally, I would suggest you are equivocating on the term "recognition" here. Fenyman makes clear he distinguishes between two different types of "recognition" as you put it. He distinguishes between being "appreciated" for his work - ie "the observation that other people use [his work]" - and being 'honored' for his work - ie "someone...decides that this work is noble enough to receive a prize". Both are forms of justice, though the latter is more direct - is explicit - where the former is very indirect - is implicit.
The difference between them is the difference between simply buying a tomato from a grocer - or in praising the grocer for the work he does. BOTH are forms of justice. But the latter is explicit. Justice is the express *purpose* of the latter. Yet Feynman finds "no sense" in such purposeful acts of justice. He considers such purposeful acts of justice to be "unreal".
I must disagree with such a view completely. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 10:53:49 mst
Comment ID: #17
Name: Faye
E-mail: faye.cheadle(at)gmail.com
This is something I have pondered in the past, and I appreciate the comments made. As a fan of films, I used to enjoy watching the Oscars, but stopped after it became clear to me that it did not celebrate the values I thought it did (I can explain this further if someone wants me to, but I'll go on so that my comment doesn't get too long). Even after I stopped watching them, I was reluctant to disparage them, because I could still see the value in recognizing achievement. However, from Diana's and Paul's comments, I see the value in criticizing particular awards, because that is also a form of justice. Criticizing something because it *does not* value the proper ideals seems appropriate. Perhaps Feynman's mistake is not being specific enough.
I think this might be a case where context is important as well. I personally find it rare to see awards given in a just manner. I agree that awards are a form of justice, but seeing real justice is, unfortunately, not common. I could defend Feynman's remarks on this basis and excuse him to a certain extent for not making that connection. Overall, it seems like he recognized what real justice should be. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 11:31:27 mst
Comment ID: #18
Name: Dana H.
BrianS, you continue to both misread the plain English in Feynman's statement and to drop the context in which he made it. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 11:58:35 mst
Comment ID: #19
Name: BrianS
"I see the value in criticizing particular awards, because that is also a form of justice."
Indeed, just as criticizing injustice which masquerades as justice is the practice of justice. Of course, there is a difference between criticizing particular honors and criticizing honors per se.
"I agree that awards are a form of justice, but seeing real justice is, unfortunately, not common."
Again, perhaps. But to reject, on principle, the act of granting to a man the rewards he has earned because one does not always respect those granting the reward or that which is being rewarded is simply wrong. That is throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.
In fact, if justice is indeed rare and injustice is common, then those rare acts of "real justice" - of honoring those who are good - should be all the *more* valuable. They should be treasures under such circumstances - just as the fewer real gems exist amidst numerous counterfeits, the greater their value. Neither "real gems" nor "real justice" should be 'disliked' or considered "unreal" because counterfeits exist. Just the opposite. The real should be identified and valued, rather than be considered as worthless (as "unreal") as the counterfeits. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 11:59:48 mst
Comment ID: #20
Name: BrianS
Dana - that is quite the accusation. Care to actually back it up with fact instead of leaving it unsupported? |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 13:44:08 mst
Comment ID: #21
Name: BrianS
From OPAR:
"Justice consists first not in condemning, but in admiring - and then in expressing one's admiration explicitly and in fighting for those one admires. It consists first in acknowledging the good: intellectually, in reaching an objective moral verdict; then existentially, in defending the good - speaking out, making one's verdict known, championing publicly the men who are rational...
What counts in life are the men who support life. They are the men who struggle unremittingly, often heroically, to achieve values. They are the Atlases whom mankind needs desperately, and who in turn desperately need the recognition - specifically, the moral recognition - to which they are entitled. They need to feel, while carrying the world on their shoulders, that they are living in a human society and that the burden is worth carrying. Otherwise, like the protagonists of Ayn Rand's novel, they too, properly, will shrug."
Note that "recognition" - the acts of rewarding the good through "praise, friendship, a sum of money or a special prerogative" or any of the other means of honoring them through expressions of 'admiration' and the granting of "sanction" - is not identified as something of "comparative little value" or something which is not "terribly important". It is in fact identified as something a rational man "desperately need[s]". |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 13:55:02 mst
Comment ID: #22
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
Is the "honors" that Feynman is referring to in his interview the same thing as the "recognition" that Peikoff is describing in OPAR? |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 14:22:19 mst
Comment ID: #23
Name: Faye
E-mail: faye.cheadle(at)gmail.com
BrianS,
This particular video was posted as a good "gut response", and as such, I'm a little confused as to why you expect a more thorough analysis of justice from Mr. Feynman. Especially with the extended interview that Paul posted. He states that awards "bother me psychologically" and has given examples as to why. He initially seems to have no problem with awards (he accepts the invitations of both Arista and the National Academy of Science), but when he sees that the people involved were more concerned about forming an elite club instead of recognizing achievement, *that's* when he decided he didn't like awards. As an initial gut response, why is this a problem? Is it a bad thing to feel grateful that someone presumably outside the influence of Objectivism realized that his work and it's use is more important than recognition? Your objections seem minor in relation to this.
-Faye |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 14:26:58 mst
Comment ID: #24
Name: David Landy
E-mail: davidalandy(at)gmail.com
In response to Comment ID No. 22:
Or a form of "psychological visibility" to use Ellen Kenner's term. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 14:32:37 mst
Comment ID: #25
Name: BrianS
Peikoff identifies "recognition" to include "praise", "money", "sanction" and other forms of 'appreciation' given to a man for his 'moral actions'. Through example, Feynman identifies "honors" to include the praise of groups of individuals who seek to award their sanction and their money for his "noble work".
So yes, I would Feynman's concept "honor" is subsumed under Peikoff's concept "recognition".
Do you claim otherwise? If so, on what basis? |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 14:54:40 mst
Comment ID: #26
Name: Lemuel
E-mail: synthesist(at)ymail.com
Isn't there a difference between accepting an award from those who truly understand the value your work and want to recognize you in a public fashion, and doing something just to get an award and use that as a claim of superiority? |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 15:20:15 mst
Comment ID: #27
Name: BrianS
Faye
"I'm a little confused as to why you expect a more thorough analysis of justice from Mr. Feynman."
I am afraid you misapprehended me. I do not "expect" anything "more" from Mr. Feynman at all. I have merely identified the fact that he is rejecting as "unreal" a valid form of justice. I do not thing such a rejection is *praiseworthy*. And I have stated the reasons why. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 15:31:58 mst
Comment ID: #28
Name: BrianS
Perhaps shifting the virtue in question will make the objection to Feynman's statement a bit easier to grasp:
"I don't like money. I'm appreciated for the work that I did, and for people who appreciate it, and I notice that other physicists use my work. I don't need anything else. I don't think there's any sense to anything else. I don't see that it makes any point that people decide that this work is noble enough to receive a monetary payment. I've already got the payment. The payment is the pleasure of finding the thing out, the kick in the discovery, the observation that other people use it. Those are the real things. The money is unreal to me. I don't believe in money. It bothers me, money..." |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 15:58:44 mst
Comment ID: #29
Name: Faye
E-mail: faye.cheadle(at)gmail.com
Shifting the virtue in question doesn't work for me, because it removes the context of his other comments. My issue is not that you object to what he said, it's that you ignore the other parts of his statement and seem to be putting "I don't believe in honors" in a vacuum. But I think I've said all I can, so if that doesn't convince you, I have nothing else to add (not trying to be snarky, I just really don't have anything else to add right now).
-Faye |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 16:09:20 mst
Comment ID: #30
Name: BrianS
Faye
"Shifting the virtue in question doesn't work for me, because it removes the context of his other comments."
Actually, it doesn't. One can easily continue the shift to the rest of his comments, producing the same results. So no vacuum. (I can demonstrate if you decide you are interested in pursuing the conversation further) |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 16:31:04 mst
Comment ID: #31
Name: BrianS
"it's that you ignore the other parts of his statement and seem to be putting "I don't believe in honors" in a vacuum."
Well, you seem to suggest I ignore the REASON he "decided he didn't like awards". I have not. I have already addressed the error involved in that reason. Of course, his reason doesn't somehow make his conclusion valid or praiseworthy. Thus, even if I hadn't addressed the error of his reasoning, the accusation that I somehow dropped context or held his conclusion in a vacuum would be invalid.
Put simply, Feynman has rejected as "unreal" and 'senseless' a valid form of justice (and thus those who properly practice it). And he has done so because he has observed some people practice this form of justice improperly.
None of that is praiseworthy. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 17:05:39 mst
Comment ID: #32
Name: Craig R
"Put simply, Feynman has rejected as "unreal" and 'senseless' a valid form of justice (and thus those who properly practice it). And he has done so because he has observed some people practice this form of justice improperly. None of that is praiseworthy."
Well stated. That was my take on Feynman's comments too. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 17:18:07 mst
Comment ID: #33
Name: BrianS
CraigR
Thank you |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 20:30:09 mst
Comment ID: #34
Name: Paul Hsieh
E-mail: paul(at)geekpress(dot)com
URL: http://www.geekpress.com
This has been a very interesting discussion.
And I think one of key points is what exactly one believes Feynman is referring to when he speaks of "honors".
If one believes he is referring to the sorts of "recognitions" that Dr. Peikoff described in OPAR, then it would indeed be wrong for Feynman to dismiss the value of such "honors", for the reasons BrianS has spelled out.
On the other hand, if one believes Feynman is referring to the activities of groups such as his Arista high school society or the National Academy of Sciences, where membership/titles are awarded on the basis of dubious or non-objective criteria, then he is justified in dismissing the value of such "honors".
Based on his remarks in the extended interview clip, I took him to using the term "honors" in that second sense.
Of course, one can appropriately criticize him for not forming the concept "honors" in the proper way (which would include just recognitions for good work granted by thinking men using objective criteria). That would be a legitimate criticism of Feynman.
But what struck me most about his original quote was how strongly he based his assessment of his own work on whether it had actual value for himself and for other physicists whom he respected. I found that visceral first-handedness orientation towards his work to be admirable, especially for someone who was not an Objectivist. Such an attitude is unfortunately too rare in contemporary American society, even amongst very creative and productive people.
Given that, I regard any error he may or may not have made about correctly identifying the nature of "honors" to be relatively minor in comparison. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 21:49:22 mst
Comment ID: #35
Name: BrianS
Paul,
I would suggest you are offering a false alternative. Feynman's precise problem is that he is failing to make the distinction you are offering as alternatives. As presented, Feynman makes absolutely NO distinction between 'honors which are awarded on the basis of objective criteria' and 'honors which are awarded on the basis of non-objective criteria'. He smears the former by considering ALL "honors" to be 'senseless'. One wonders, therefore, what evidence is being referenced when it is claimed Feynman is *limiting* his conception of "honors" to JUST the "dubious or non-objective" awards - or that Feynman even recognizes there is any other type of 'honor' except such "dubious" ones.
In fact, by admitting that Feynman has NOT formed a proper concept of "honors" because it does not "include just recognitions for good work" etc, one is admitting that Feynman has failed to make exactly the distinction your second alternative suggests he is making. He tars ALL awards etc on the basis of the 'dubiousness' of some awards.
"I found that visceral first-handedness orientation towards his work to be admirable"
His independence (and productiveness) is admirable. That has never been disputed. But neither independence nor productiveness were his topic. Justice was his topic. Identifying a given form of justice as "unreal" and 'senseless' was the *point* of his statement. Independence was simply a means by which he justified his attack. In other words, his aim was an attack on one virtue And it was perpetrated by means of another virtue.
I do not consider such an attack to be a "relatively minor" issue (comparatively or on its own). Contextually I would say it IS the issue. |
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| Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 22:03:48 mst
Comment ID: #36
Name: BrianS
As an additional point, I would suggest Feynman's reference to "honors" being "epaulets" and "uniforms" - ie indicators of ranks earned in the military - stands in direct contradiction to the claim that he is just "referring to the activities of groups such as his Arista high school society or the National Academy of Sciences, where membership/titles are awarded on the basis of dubious or non-objective criteria" - as opposed to referencing ALL honors, be they objective or not. |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 4:12:31 mst
Comment ID: #37
Name: Mike Hardy
E-mail: (my last name) (at) math.umn.edu
> As an additional point, I would
> suggest Feynman's reference to
> "honors" being "epaulets" and
> "uniforms" - ie indicators of
> ranks earned in the military -
> stands in direct contradiction
> to the claim that he is just
> "referring to the activities
> of groups such as his Arista
> high school society or the
> National Academy of Sciences,
> where membership/titles are
> awarded on the basis of dubious
> or non-objective criteria"
That's not a "direct contradiction" unless you attribute to Feynmann the belief that epaulets and uniforms are indicators of earned ranks. But it seems clear that what Feynmann meant was: "Honors are awarded on the basis of dubious or non-objective criteria like ranks in the military". |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 8:42:39 mst
Comment ID: #38
Name: BrianS
mike - You make my point. Unless you believe that military rank etc is NOT earned, then Feynman is smearing ALL such awards as unearned. He does not identify ANY honor as deserved - including those which are. He admits this at the very beginning of the longer version. He says he has no idea if his work is worth an award. He doesn't know "what's worth what" when it comes to honors. He doesn't see a way of making such judgment objectively, which is why for him ALL awards - all "honors" - fall into the "non-objective" category. |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 11:46:57 mst
Comment ID: #39
Name: Dana H.
"Dana - that is quite the accusation. Care to actually back it up with fact instead of leaving it unsupported?"
I already have. Re-read my first comment. |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 12:07:03 mst
Comment ID: #40
Name: BrianS
Dana
Actually the "support" you provide previously was explicitly addressed (and I would say refuted). You do *nothing* to address ANY of the objections to your original claim. You IGNORE those objections and simply REPEAT your claim as if no argument has been presented against it.
I'm sorry but that is *not* a form of rational support for an assertion. |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 12:15:02 mst
Comment ID: #41
Name: BrianS
"Feynman was absolutely not saying that he was indifferent to others' just recognition of his work." - Straw man
"He cared about recognition from fellow working physicists, but not from the Swedish Academy (or NAS)." - Straw man
"Indifference to honors does not mean indifference to justice." - Straw man
"If a young, bright physicist "honored" Feynman by saying, "I love Feynman diagrams and use them all the time," he would surely be pleased. When Feyman referred to "honors," it should be clear that he meant "formal awards bestowed by committees," not any other meaning of the term." - Straw man
In other words, you never even addressed MY argument in the first place. So - CONTRARY to your claim - you provided NO logical support for your accusations against me. |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 17:57:41 mst
Comment ID: #42
Name: Mike Hardy
E-mail: (my last name) (at) math.umn.edu
> Unless you believe that military
> rank etc is NOT earned, then Feynman is
etc........
But it's not a question of whether __I__ regard military rank as unearned; it's a question of whether _Feynman_ regards it as unearned. |
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| Friday, July 17, 2009 at 18:48:00 mst
Comment ID: #43
Name: BrianS
Mike
No. It is *precisely* a question of whether YOU rationally regard military rank as earned - as objective. I *agree* with you that Feynman dismisses military rank as one of the things which are senseless - unreal - unearned - something to be disliked. THAT IS MY POINT. Feynman identifies something which IS earned and treats it as if it is UNearned.
That, as I said, is a *contradiction* of Paul's claim that Feynman is *only* referencing "honors" which are indeed non-objective like the Arista club and that he is *not* referencing actual objective honors of the kind Dr. P references.
Again, as I also said, Feynman explicitly admits: when it comes to honors he has no idea "what's worth what". In other words, he does not know of an objective standard for honors. So he considers ALL honors - including ones WE understand to be objective - to be non-objective and thus unreal. And doing that, as Paul put it, is "wrong". |
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| Saturday, July 18, 2009 at 22:08:45 mst
Comment ID: #44
Name: Mike Hardy
E-mail: (my last name) (at) math.umn.edu
A hypothesis:
Feynman appreciates having others appreciate his work. But he dislikes telling people to appreciate his work. Wearing a uniform is _telling_ people to appreciate one's rank. Getting a Nobel Prize is _telling_ people to appreciate one's work. |
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| Saturday, July 18, 2009 at 22:58:04 mst
Comment ID: #45
Name: BrianS
Mike
Since you now present a *different* argument, I take it you finally recognized the contradiction I was talking about?
As to your new argument:
"he dislikes telling people to appreciate his work"
"Getting a Nobel Prize is _telling_ people to appreciate one's work."
I see no nothing in his statement which supports ANY part of your "hypothesis". Which of his statements lead you to any of those premises? And what about my conclusion causes you to continue to reject it, despite it being based on what he has actually stated?
It is beginning to seem as if people simply do not *want* the conclusion I present to be true. |
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