A daily dose of philosophical food for your noodle!
NoodleFood : RSS Feed | via E-mail | Recent Comments | Archives
NoodleCast : M4A via iTunes (MP3) | via Feed Reader | via E-mail
Diana Hsieh : Rationally Selfish | PhiloFiles | Explore Atlas Shrugged
OList Mailing Lists | FIRM | FRO | Secular Government

 Sunday, July 13, 2008

The Importance of the Subject

By Roderick Fitts @ 6:04 PM

The January 2008 issue of the journal Social Philosophy and Policy had numerous papers focusing on the "Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics."[1] Among them was Objectivist philosopher Dr. Tara Smith's "The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value."

In this paper, Dr. Smith elaborates on philosopher Ayn Rand's view that the individual (the "subject") plays an important role in the generation and the instructions of an objective morality.

To appreciate what Dr. Smith is pointing out, consider the following examples:

(1) Tiger Woods and his accomplishments. Woods has deliberately sought a particular type of life as a professional golfer, and as we can all attest, has had an extraordinary amount of success in his efforts. He paid attention to facts relevant to his goal as a great golfer, such as the value of practicing his golf swing and buying effective golf equipment (or even changing his swing when it injures him).[2]

(2) John Allison, the chairman and CEO of BB&T bank. Allison drove towards a particular career, and, like Woods, is also very successful in his field, the banking industry. He identified certain business actions as practical, and engaged in them, including teaching his employees his personal value system, and funding courses and organizations in support of Capitalism.

These examples illustrate that seeking life makes certain actions, objects, and positions objective values or disvalues relative to certain facts of life's requirements and to an individual's goals and purposes. Not adequately practicing before an upcoming golf championship would be a disvalue for Woods, because it would decrease his chance of winning, possibly lessen his endorsements, and reduce his general ability as a golf player--which means: all things considered, it would be bad for his life. Increasing the economic value of BB&T's products would be a value for Allison, by contrast, because it would likely increase his company's success, increase shareholder value, and allow his company to buffer any future losses--meaning that it would be good for his life, fully considered. Objective values are needs that we should pursue because they are conducive to our lives, and they allow us to succeed at our chosen goal of living--this is Rand's basic depiction of objective values.

Another element of the objectivity of values Smith points out is that it is relational: while things or practices can benefit us, such as a better golf swing in Woods' case, they can only function as values if the person identifies them as beneficial--as worth the effort of gaining. This relational aspect of objective values highlights the crucial role that our free will plays. Certain biological facts make certain things beneficial and other things harmful regardless of our own thoughts and opinions towards them, but our thoughts do matter in regards to considering some benefits as "values," because our conclusions will determine if we act towards what we believe to be values.

We need to seek beneficial objects to enhance our lives, and many of these beneficial things can only be gained by our deliberate choices and actions--meaning that in order to be successful, we must know how to choose and what to choose. In Smith's (and Rand's) view, this is precisely why we need morality. "A moral code," Smith writes, "identifies the kinds of ends that a person should seek (values) and the kinds of actions that he should take to secure values (virtues)."[3]

This understanding of how the individual's choice to live and his pursuit of identified beneficial things is (partly) what gives rise to objective values (and morality) is one of Smith's points in the essay.

The other point highlighting how pivotal the individual is in an objective morality centers around the concept of "objectivity" itself.[4] In short, our thoughts and choices don't automatically conform to reality, and so we discover that it is necessary to identify methods of thinking which take the facts into consideration (objective) and contrast them with methods which ignore or evade relevant facts (non-objective). For example, Woods changing his swing when it injured him is a professionally objective approach insofar as he paid attention to relevant facts (his physical condition, his previous golf approach, negative consequences of not changing his swing, etc.) in order to succeed in his goals.

The need to pursue values, coupled with the facts that we don't automatically pursue them and don't automatically know how to succeed, are the grounds for an objective morality--a morality that makes possible systematic guidance in determining if our actions conform to the facts and our goals, or if they don't.

It is the deliberate choice to live, the identification of certain beneficial things which one should pursue (objective values), and an objective approach to one's life-decisions that demonstrates the importance of the subject in an objective morality.

Before concluding, I'd like to point out one of the implications of this view of moral objectivity.[5] Namely, that Smith-Rand's view of morality places its function solely in the advancement of one's own life--it is egoistic.[6] This moral code is concerned with one's self-interest and how to realistically accomplish it. As Smith notes:
The question that a person faces, in aspiring to moral objectivity, is not how to escape his vantage point, either literally or figuratively, but how to make his view conform with reality. What is the nature of this thing that I am considering? And what sort of impact is it most likely to exert on my life? These are the principal questions that a person must address.[7]
A very illuminating essay, which may be of particular interest to those who think of an "objective morality" as a set of duties to be fulfilled in total disregard to one's interests.

References and Notes
[1] All of the essays in the January issue are available for free
viewing, and no registration required.

[2] The Truth About Tiger

[3] Tara Smith (2008). The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value. Social Philosophy and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 25: p. 132.

[4] For more on the concept of "objectivity," the Ayn Rand Lexicon entry on objectivity.

[5] Another implication Smith points out in the paper is that Rand's view of moral objectivity rejects a single list of values, identical for everyone (which is usually a characteristic of the moral objectivism position in philosophy). Many of the things Tiger Woods pursues in connection to his profession as a golfer are values for him, but probably are not values for John Allison, since he is in a different line of work. Similarly, the values they both pursue (organizations they support and career) legitimately differ. By "legitimate," I second Smith's remark that the "parameters defining the permissible range are themselves objective insofar as they are grounded in the natural requirements of human life" (Smith, "The Importance of the Subject," p. 143).

[6] See more on egoism in chapter 6 of Smith's book, Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, and in this Ayn Rand Lexicon entry on Selfishness

[7] "The Importance of the Subject," p. 146

Labels: ,

Share |
   E-mail Roderick Fitts     PermaLink ()    Comments (New Page)

  Subscribe to NoodleFood Blog Posts via Feed Reader   via E-mail
Subscribe to NoodleCast Podcasts M4A via iTunes (MP3)   via Feed Reader   via E-mail

 Comments

Monday, July 14, 2008 at 2:03:26 mst
Comment ID: #1
Name: Rory
E-mail: futurebebop(at)gmail.com

It seems like that whole Issue is a collection of bad-ass Objectivist philosophers.

Nice article, Roderick.


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 4:35:32 mst
Comment ID: #2
Name: EB
URL: http://the-undercurrent.com/

Rod/Diana,

You should check the links in this article. They seem not to work. Also, it also seems like the articles in the journal are in fact inaccessible.

Thanks.


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 4:54:57 mst
Comment ID: #3
Name: Burgess Laughlin
E-mail: burgesslaughlin(at)macforcego.com
URL: http://www.aristotleadventure.blogspot.com

Congratulations to Roderick Fitts for writing a clear, straight-forward, and informative article about a crucial topic. Among the valuable points he makes is one that appears in a footnote:

"[5] Another implication Smith points out in the paper is that Rand's view of moral objectivity rejects a single list of values, identical for everyone (which is usually a characteristic of the moral objectivism position in philosophy)."

Mr. Fitts, reporting Dr. Smith's position, has here indirectly highlighted a fundamental difference between Objectivism and objectivism. In Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, objectivity, as a term, names two ideas that have an implication for a third one:

(1) Metaphysical (ontological) meaning of objectivity: existence of things outside and independent of the mind.

(2) Epistemological meaning of objectivity: a relationship between an idea in the mind and a thing outside the mind, a relationship of logical inference.

(3) Ethical meaning of objectivity: a value is derived logically from an independent fact of reality.

In traditional history of philosophy, according to my understanding, "objectivism" refers only to the first: things (including values) exist independently of consciousness. The difference between Objectivism and objectivism is thus not merely a typographical one, but a radical one, in epistemology and therefore in ethics.


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 6:29:19 mst
Comment ID: #4
Name: Diana Hsieh
E-mail: diana(at)dianahsieh.com
URL: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog

EB -- The links work fine for me. (And I'm working from home, not at school, so that's not the issue.)


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 9:16:56 mst
Comment ID: #5
Name: Roderick Fitts
E-mail: rodfitts(at)gmail.com

EB -- The links worked for my laptop, which doesn't have special access to philosophy journals this summer (I'm not taking courses at the University of Michigan this spring and summer semester). They also work for my grandfather's computer, and he has no special access, either.

Rory/Burgess -- Thanks, I had a lot of fun writing it.

The distinction between Objectivism's view of "objective values" and Moral objectivism's (i.e. Intrinsicist) view is definitely a /big/ difference, one which Smith thinks can further the "objectivism/subjectivism" debate in ethics (personally, I think it will show that the debate is artificial, at best).

A quick summary for any newcomers: the "debate" is about whether we determine moral truths on our own, or if they exist regardless of what we think about them. The "subjectivists" take the first view, giving us (individually or socially/culturally) the power to determine what "moral facts" are, no matter how we go about doing it. The "objectivists" take the other view, that "moral truths" exist /within/ certain things, and must simply be dealt with in a manner similar to physical facts.

Both positions are wrong, according to Objectivism--they are wrong in how they ascribe reality to values (the metaphysics of values) and specifically what role they say our minds play in the existence of values (the epistemology of values). I couldn't explain precisely why they're wrong (to my satisfaction) here in the comments, but I think it would be an interesting topic for the future.


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 10:44:30 mst
Comment ID: #6
Name: Oist Newbie
E-mail: onew93(at)yahoo.com

How many different ethical systems have been offered? I know egoism and altruism are the main two but are they the only two? There is Divine Command Theory and that is altruistic. But what of the virtue ethical systems? Isn't that what Aristotle's system was? And how is hedonism to be classified? Was Rand's ethics the first egoist morality or was it the first consistent (non-compromised) egoist morality?


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 11:01:55 mst
Comment ID: #7
Name: William H. Stoddard
E-mail: whswhs(at)mindspring.com
URL: http://whswhs.livejournal.com/

Smith's discussion of values seems to dovetail, in a way that might not be obvious, with the conference's title. The Objectivist of value is relativistic, not in the sense in which philosophers use the term, but in the more precise sense in which it was previously used in the physical sciences.

Einstein said, for example, that the mass of an electron was relative to the observer: different observers would measure different masses depending on their velocities relative to the electron. But Einstein did NOT say that the mass of an electron was subjective, or that any physicist was free to assign it whatever mass they liked. For each observer, there was one correct mass for the electron, and there were certain valid procedures for measuring its mass, which would all give the same result, up to each procedure's level of accuracy of measurement. That is, the mass was objective. Moreover, there was a quantity, the "rest mass," which could be computed by any observer, and which would be the same for all observers. This was called an "invariant," and I have read that in the original German, Einstein described his theory as an Invariententheorie, a theory of invariants, not as "relativity theory."

In THAT sense of relativity, values are relative to the organisms involved. For example, carbon dioxide, water, and minerals will nourish a green plant; cellulose will nourish a termite or a sheep; but neither will do a cat or a dragonfly any good. But for each organism, there are substances that have objective nutritional value for it, and others that don't, even though those are different substances for different kinds of organisms. Value is relative to the organism, but not subjective.

Similarly, within a species, value is relative to individual differencesâ€"for example, a newborn mammal needs milk, but an adult mammal does not, and typically cannot digest it; that is, value is relative to age, and likewise to sex.

Relativity of value also applies within the human species, in particular. See Ayn Rand's example of the stenographer buying lipstick rather than saving for an (improbable) medical emergency. Identifying all the factors that make different things objectively valuable to different people would be a huge question. But neither throwing up one's hands and saying, "You can choose to value anything you please," nor declaring that the same things are automatically valuable for everybody, is a satisfactory way of dealing with the issue. Your examples neatly illustrate this.

I suspect that, ultimately, it will be necessary to view ethics not merely as an applied science rather than a theoretical science, but as an art as well as an applied science.


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 12:11:02 mst
Comment ID: #8
Name: Roderick Fitts
E-mail: rodfitts(at)gmail.com

Oist Newbie -- There are many ethical systems, and several distinctions (theories) within each system. I haven't studied Ethical philosophy to the extent that I could honestly say how many have existed, though.

I don't think egoism and altruism are major positions in ethics--rather, I think they are implications of the basis for an ethical code.

Aristotle's system is (in my opinion) the quintessential Virtue Ethical system, I would say it is egoistic (i.e. Aristotle's view that we should seek our own eudaimonia, and become a "great-souled" person).

Hedonism, in the Epicurean sense, was a type of egoism, but I think it has a mistaken view of egoism, and of what grounds a moral code (I don't think pleasure does). Modern hedonism is an even more corrupted form of egoism, ignoring future consequences and merely indulging in immediate pleasurable activities (the Greek philosopher Aristippus' statement "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die" fits very well with this modern version). There are altruistic forms of hedonism: for instance, Utilitarianism (whether Bentham's or Mill's).

I think Rand's view is the first consistent form of egoism which can give us practical guidance in living (and hence the strongest form).


Monday, July 14, 2008 at 14:42:35 mst
Comment ID: #9
Name: Mike
E-mail: atlas51184(at)comcast.net

EB,

If you try to do the right click, open in new window/tab thing, it wont work. Left click the link for html or pdf. That might help.


Tuesday, July 15, 2008 at 10:18:57 mst
Comment ID: #10
Name: Ritu

Great synopsis, Roderick.


 Post Your Comment

Name or Handle:
E-mail:
URL:
 Remember Me
 
Comment:  
No HTML is allowed. URLs will be automatically converted into clickable links.

Commenters are welcome to clearly state their own views, as well as to criticize opposing views and arguments. Unjust personal attacks are not welcome.

The NoodleFood comments are not a general discussion board. Do not post random questions or comments, except on the designated "open threads" posted on Wednesdays and Sundays.

To weed out spammers: 5 plus 1 equals 8477825991409521182