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Comments |
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 | Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 0:45:14 mst
Comment ID: #1
Name: Dan G.
Greg,
Please tell me that you are considering integrating these recent posts (and those to come) into a book. |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 7:53:10 mst
Comment ID: #2
Name: Eric Dennis
"It is this ironclad law of existence that tells us there are scientific laws to pursue in the first place."
Although I agree with your criticism of Hitchens et al., I think this statement is off. Nothing tells us that there are scientific laws, except observing nature and gaining the laws themselves inductively. We cannot deduce even the existence of *scientific* laws from axiomatic concepts. Indeed I think an attempt at such a deduction would play into the religious dogmatist's hand, as a kind of concession to Platonism. |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 8:40:24 mst
Comment ID: #3
Name: Jeff Montgomery
E-mail: jamontgom(at)hotmail.com
On the epistemological side (regarding D'Souza's question to Hitchens) there can't truly be valid scientific laws with exceptions, can there?
There can be differences of *context*, cases in which a law may or may not apply, or may have its input variables... vary... in which case the prediction will also vary. For example, the law of gravity will not predict the same accelerations both here and on the moon, or if there is wind resistance slowing the rate of descent. But these are differences of factual context, not of the law itself. They actually press home the great *power* of such laws, by demonstrating how precise and flexible they are in a real-world application.
It seems that the underlying meaning of D'Souza's question is a conceptual version of the violation of the law of identity that you reject in your discussion of causality. He believes in *conceptual miracles*; that is, he believes that concepts can inexplicably be valid and invalid in the same context. He relies on Hitchens' assumption that D'Souza is talking about context (which is a valid notion and would be crippling if rejected), but in fact D'Souza is talking about a nonsensical contradiction that does not invalidate anything. Hitchens confuses the two, accepts the skepticism, and is rendered helpless. |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 10:29:58 mst
Comment ID: #4
Name: Ichor
To Hitchens credit, he's a journalist and not a scientist. And to D'Souza's discredit, he's just ripping off Hitchens gimmick of naming an act by a believer an atheist couldn't do. |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 10:30:23 mst
Comment ID: #5
Name: Greg Perkins
E-mail: greg(at)ecosmos.com
URL: http://ecosmos.com
Hi, Eric. Thank you, I appreciate cautions against Platonism/Rationalism, though I don't see any real basis for fearing that here. The paragraph that line is from is emphasizing (without using the technical term) how this 'law of existence' is the necessary and inescapable *basis* of induction in the first place -- including those inductive generalizations about the world which science entails. Hmm. Maybe the trouble is that I might be confused in (and of course welcome any needed straightening-out on) broadly considering any and all inductive generalizations about nature to be "scientific laws." |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 10:41:57 mst
Comment ID: #6
Name: Greg Perkins
E-mail: greg(at)ecosmos.com
URL: http://ecosmos.com
Hi, Ichor. Yes, Hitchens is a journalist, but he is arguing as a modern man informed by science/scientists -- and in taking on this territory he certainly knows that arguments from miracles are quite common.
If scientists were more clear on the basis of what they are up to, Hitchens would have known how to slam-dunk D'Souza. Or from the opposite angle: if scientists were more clear on the basis of what they are up to, Hitchens would never have had that chance to slam dunk D'Souza because D'Souza would have known to avoid the issue of miracles. Neither happened, though -- hence my opportunity to try to share something important. :^) |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 10:51:11 mst
Comment ID: #7
Name: Jeff Montgomery
E-mail: jamontgom(at)hotmail.com
Eric Dennis said:
>"It is this ironclad law of existence that tells us there are scientific laws to pursue in the first place."
>Although I agree with your criticism of Hitchens et al., I think this statement is off. Nothing tells us that
>there are scientific laws, except observing nature and gaining the laws themselves inductively.
I think Greg is simply saying it's the specific and unchanging properties of things that makes possible the discovery of the laws governing them. |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 10:52:49 mst
Comment ID: #8
Name: Greg Perkins
E-mail: greg(at)ecosmos.com
URL: http://ecosmos.com
Thanks, Dan! I'm glad you are enjoying the series -- but no, I am not working on a book. (I would need to build up a lot more muscle first. ;^) |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 12:50:22 mst
Comment ID: #9
Name: Steve
E-mail: skaldor(at)gfschools.org
When D'Souza asked "What scientific law has no exceptions?" Could Hitchens have said that the law of gravity has no exceptions? |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 13:28:59 mst
Comment ID: #10
Name: Greg Perkins
E-mail: greg(at)ecosmos.com
URL: http://ecosmos.com
Hi, Steve. Really, Hitchens was in a bit of a when-did-you-stop-beating-your-wife bind... D'Souza was leaning on the common, a-contextual way most people approach knowledge in asking him to name a law he *knows* has no exceptions (i.e., where he/anyone knows there is no context which could ever surprise scientists and cause them to modify or further qualify their formulation of the principle). Not being omniscient, Hitchens demurred.
The contextual nature of knowledge and what that means for scientific laws is important, but not for a piece like this. :^) So I simply went "sideways", explaining how the question is a distraction and refocusing on a deeper/better-framed aspect to eliminate the motivation that brought the question in the first place. |
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| Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 18:08:11 mst
Comment ID: #11
Name: Richard
E-mail: rnbramwell(at)valuedminds.com
Let's just ask Dinesh to suppose that the words or text he produces, one day, emerge from his lips or his keyboard as Spaghettini Marinara garnished with fresh Oregano.
Hey Dinesh, consider,
1- sound is a function of molecules bouncing against others until the process attenuates, and
2- light from a monitor is radiation produced by energetically stimulated atoms.
So, Dinesh, what happens to the rest of the molecular and atomic universe while sound and light are converted to Spaghettini Marinara with fresh Oregano?
What happens to the molecules in Dinesh's retina that catch light; what happens to the sound vibrations emanating from Dinesh's vocal chords; what happens to the molecules that maintain the structure of the hairs in the cochlea by which Dinesh hears?
Whilst such laws are being violated during a miracle, what happens to the rest of the Universe? Is it simply excluded?
Do the rules everywhere else stay unchanged, whilst Dinesh's words, typed or spoken, are converted to spaghettini?
Oh, and Dinesh, how would you know? Your vocal chords and your eyes would be spaghettini!
Oh, you say GOD makes the laws universal, except when he chooses to violate them.
Ummmm, how did you know that? You could not have known it when your retinol molecules were spaghettini, because spaghettini has a pretty low-grade neural polarization spike.
And exactly why should we believe all those special exceptions? Dang, it must be Sunday School and I must be five years old, because that was the last time someone tried to pull such 'wool' over my eyes. |
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| Thursday, May 29, 2008 at 6:59:29 mst
Comment ID: #12
Name: Diana Hsieh
E-mail: diana(at)dianahsieh.com
URL: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog
Greg (and others),
The fundamental case against miracles is the argument you've outlined, i.e. the fact that miracles would violate the law of identity. A less fundamental epistemological argument is that any claim to miracles is an appeal to ignorance. However, I'm wondering what you think of Hume's classic case against miracles.
For anyone unfamiliar with it, the classic two-part text is here:
http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/14.html
http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/15.html
Let me quote a few paragraphs of his essential case:
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: he weighs the opposite experiments: he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.
... [Hume then discusses the importance -- and pitfalls -- of testimony.]
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.
The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), ‘that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.’ When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
***
I'm particularly interested in your judgment of Hume's "general maxim," namely that "that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish." Is that right -- even if not the fundamental case? Or does it somehow concede too much to the theist (or depend on skepticism)?
Oh, and thanks for another excellent essay, Greg! |
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| Thursday, May 29, 2008 at 9:11:26 mst
Comment ID: #13
Name: Doug Krening
E-mail: dkrenobj(at)mac.com
Diana,
Hume's argument does indeed concede too much to the theist. It cedes all of metaphysics. This is why both Hume and Hitchens cannot answer the theists.
The philosophy of science is built on a framework which denies that metaphysics has any meaning. This entire branch of philosophy (like many others, I suppose) needs to be rewritten from the ground up with a proper metaphysics at its base.
When D'Souza asked "... to name just one scientific law which he knows has no exceptions.", Hitchens should have answered "the law of identity." But this is a statement of metaphysics and "everyone knows" that it is therefore not a proper scientific statement. It is the malformed philosophy of science which forces Hitchens' impotence. The theists must be engaged at the level of metaphysics, as Greg does in this article. At this level, the argument against the supernatural is devastating.
Greg, these essays are excellent! I really look forward the to next one. |
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| Thursday, May 29, 2008 at 9:35:28 mst
Comment ID: #14
Name: Greg M
E-mail: gregsmullen(a)hotmail.com
Kind of off topic but I just found this awesome website called Your Religion Sucks: http://www.stupidwish.net/religion.html |
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| Thursday, May 29, 2008 at 15:45:33 mst
Comment ID: #15
Name: Anke
E-mail: ankepooh(at)gmail.com
Dear Greg,
Reading your post was like feeling a ray of sunshine after months of overcast skies. I am a graduate student in the sciences and, while I actually quite admire the writings of Richard Dawkins (Hitchen's really just likes to hear himself talk, without seeming to recognize the necessity of applying critical thought or purposeful direction to his verbiage), I find myself surrounded by scientists who will fight to the death in favor of the theory of evolution, yet shy away from discussions about mysticism. I could write pages on the disastrous effects this unwillingness to take a stand for reality-based reasoning has had, and continues to have, on the direction of scientific investigation, and perhaps more disturbingly, the type of young student attracted to pursuing advance degrees in science. But that is not the reason for this comment. I wanted to share with you, as an example of the type of muddled thinking I am surrounded with, an article I wrote a few months ago in response to a pro-intelligent design article in our local newspaper. My article tried to address what I see as the heart of the ID versus evolution debate, and what you have so eloquently described in your article above: the idea that science is a process of non-contradictory identification. Sadly, my article not only did not get published in our local newspaper (surprise), but was met with a mixture of confusion and apprehension from the very science peers and mentors who had encouraged me to write the article in the first place. THe main complaints were 1) that my article was too 'intellectual' and 2) that my article took an unnecessary stance on the non-existence of God. The level of compartmentalization among scientists who still practice religion (a minority) baffles me, but what I find more disconcerting and impossible to comprehend are those scientist who admit to being atheist in private (a majority) yet refuse to understand the importance of voicing such a choice--perhaps because they themselves have not taken the necessary steps toward understanding the further reaching philosophical implications of an atheist, or reality-oriented, stance on the universe. It is as though such scientists operate in a vacuum in which reality is only important and applicable in the laboratory but does not need consideration in the outside world.
Cheers.
a.
My article:
As a PhD student in biophysics, I could certainly write a solid argument in favor of evolution, but I suspect that more evidence for the theory of evolution is not what is needed in the current debate. In fact, I am confident that I can set aside a discussion of the theory of evolution, and still provide ample reasons why the theory of intelligent design (ID) does not deserve consideration by the scientific community.
To begin, let us consider what a scientific theory is, and the requirements for an idea to be labeled a scientific theory. As a scientist, one's job is to observe empirical facts and to integrate them into hypotheses that attempt to explain the nature of our universe. A hypothesis is a summary of the observable facts of reality, and a logical extension of these facts that incorporates all previous empirical observations into a statement that adheres to the causal laws of the earth. It is only after a hypothesis has been supported by an overwhelming amount of physical evidence, that it becomes a theory. An example of a scientific theory is the theory of relativity.
Now, let's take a closer look at the theory of ID. ID holds that an intelligent being, frequently referred to as God, was responsible for designing life on earth. By definition, such a being is not subject to the physical laws of our universe; in fact, given the ability to manipulate reality, an intelligent designer is above the laws of causality. The very nature, then, of such an intelligence, is that it is not empirically observable. Since the work of a scientist is "limited" to that which can be observed in reality, this means that any hypothesis or theory that depends on the existence of a not-of-this-world designer is outside the realm of what is considerable to a scientist. Importantly, in the absence of empirical evidence, such theories as ID do not fulfill the requirements to be considered scientific theories, but can at best be considered popular opinions. An example of another popular opinion, that is not a scientific theory, is the idea of reincarnation.
Judging from the misrepresented NAS report quotation, the distortion of the Richard Sternberg and Caroline Crocker stories, and the misuse of quotations from NAS members in Casey Luskin’s March 5th article, I suspect that the ID movement is well aware of the lack of empirical evidence for its stance. Not being able to provide hard, solid evidence for the legitimacy of its theory, ID proponents attempt to hide this deficiency by focusing on "debunking" evolution and its supporters. The tactic of slinging mud to detract from one's own deficiencies is one frequently used in politics, but it does not have a place in the realm of science, where facts reign. No amount of "holes" in the theory of evolution can give legitimacy to an idea such as ID that is not based in the observable facts of reality. |
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| Friday, May 30, 2008 at 15:06:47 mst
Comment ID: #16
Name: Steve
E-mail: skaldor(at)gfschools.org
Greg's "D'Souza example" is intriguing because it is exasperatingly difficult to answer a philosophic question with the succinctness a debate requires. For that reason, I think having a "pat answer" to these more common feints " a brief retort that includes both the fundamental and a concretization " is necessary to the propagation of Objectivist ideas.
So, assuming the state of science today and assuming a general audience, what is an good answer (in three sentences) to D'Souza's question: What scientific law has no exception?
My "pat answer":
In its proper context, no scientific law has an exception because science is based on the identity of things. The law of gravitation, for example, is part of the identity of matter everywhere in the universe, which is why man can fly to the moon. And the absolute of identity is why miracles are impossible, why elephants can't fly. |
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| Friday, May 30, 2008 at 15:14:00 mst
Comment ID: #17
Name: Freddy Be-Zeev
E-mail: benzeev(at)comcast(dot)net
Steve, I would add to your answer that whenever an exception is found to a scientific law (and it is validated), it becomes part of the law. The law is modified to say "so and so is always true, except under these specified circumstances" (and usually with an explanation to the cause of the exception). |
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| Sunday, June 1, 2008 at 16:15:06 mst
Comment ID: #18
Name: Greg Perkins
E-mail: greg(at)ecosmos.com
URL: http://gregperkins.net
Diana asks about Hume's case against miracles...
>>> A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. <<<
Hume seems to be expressing that troubled account of induction here: you may know with *full certainty* that every swan you've met was white and that the sun has risen every 24 hours in your life -- but such experience *in itself* is not a basis for thinking future swans must be white and that the sun must rise in the future. Genuine induction doesn't come from brute repetitions of that kind of observation, but from isolating and grasping the aspects of the relevant existents' identities that would causally require the whiteness or the rising (and that's something that may not take many observations at all). So judgments based on Hume's style of induction are brittle. My examples weren't accidental: consider that with the same quality of evidence on Hume's account, one of these "fully-proven" judgments is wrong (black swans were discovered in Australia), and one of these is right (yes, the sun will rise tomorrow, barring a supernova or something ;^).
>>> In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: he weighs the opposite experiments: he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. <<<
Sure, *in ignorance of* any actual causal knowledge of the entities involved, one can only make such statistical assessments of probability. But carefully reporting the frequency of this vs. that result is superficial compared to actually isolating the causal factors at play that would explain that frequency.
>>> A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior. <<<
Really, this seems more like a way of establishing when to accept something which seems exceptional (to a law of nature as we understand it) as actual. For the reasons I discussed in the article in the paragraph talking about what a miracle has to be, no such surprise could actually demonstrate supernatural intervention; when such a "miracle" happens, it is nothing but a call for more study to see whether and how our current understanding needs correction or refinement -- it would be irrational to conclude that such a surprise was in fact some supernatural power's whimsical intervention. So when he talks about "miracles" and the "miraculous" in his Maxim, I really have to take it as "exception" and "exceptional":
>>> The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), ‘that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.’ When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. <<<
What do I think of this Maxim? At first blush it seems to cloud the true nature of "miracles", and to encourage people to be certain when it is not warranted due to its reliance on and encouragement of that superficial, statistical model of induction. The goal in scientific understanding is causal understanding -- not merely noting statistical probabilities of events (not even if they are nice probabilities like 100%).
Greg |
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| Sunday, August 31, 2008 at 15:19:20 mst
Comment ID: #19
Name: Lesli
My primary thought about this article is regarding your “contradictory identity” issue. As you stated, for something to actually be a miracle would require actual divine intervention. So, the object of a miracle is acted upon; it doesn’t act of its own accord in order to become the object of a miracle. This seems not only obvious but also contradictory to your assertion that the thing becomes what it is not. This is true by definition, and must be true even if miracles have never occurred. |
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| Friday, September 5, 2008 at 8:58:43 mst
Comment ID: #20
Name: Greg Perkins
E-mail: greg(at)ecosmos.com
URL: http://ecosmos.com
Hi, Lesli. I'm sorry you didn't understand what I wrote.
Yes, objects of miracles are typically acted upon, in that something changes in their context to make them to act in some way -- that's why I talked about "things which are acting and interacting" in the article. Yet it is nonetheless the case that the object of a miracle is itself acting, and crucially, *its* action is what the person of faith takes to be indicative of God or whatever. Consider: I push the ball, *it* rolls; I blow on the birthday candles, *they* go out. If the ball started doing the cha-cha instead of rolling, *it* would be acting contrary to its identity as an ordinary ball. If the candles sprouted wings and started buzzing around my head, *they* would be acting contrary to their identity as ordinary candles. If an ordinary bush starts talking, *it* is acting contrary to its identity. Notice that the miracle is the action of the bush, the ball, the candles, the whatever.
My point is that if we were simply *ignorant* of deeper aspects of a thing's identity that give rise to some surprising action -- i.e., if the surprising action is really just a thing acting in accordance with its not-understood identity -- then that would be the opposite of a miracle. It would be a lawful phenomenon. So, meaningful miracles require violating identity. As I put it in the article, "In short, a genuine miracle requires a thing to act against its own identity -- to have a contradictory identity -- to literally *not be what it is*, which is incoherent. Everything is what it is, and contradictions can only exist inside peoples' confused thinking."
Thanks,
Greg |
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| Friday, October 10, 2008 at 10:46:39 mst
Comment ID: #21
Name: Tito
E-mail: enestot(at)yahoo.com
URL: http://beingandfaith.blogspot.com
The scientific method is simply researchers proposing hypotheses as explanations of phenomena, and experimenting to test these hypotheses. The experiments must be repeatable. Theories that encompass wider domains of inquiry may bind many hypotheses together in a coherent model. This in turn may help form new hypotheses or place groups of hypotheses into context. If a newer model or set of hypotheses better explains the phenomena, then it replaces the older model. Aristotle was not a proponent of this because was not around when wrote. The Randian stripped down version you present here does not hold water. Take for your example of an egg breaking into song, if it did then there would be a category, singing eggs. Under that model, anything new would get a new name, hence the bread that Jesus used to feed the multitudes was by its nature and existence bread-feeding-multitudes by existence allowable. Whether it happened or not, the theory explains it. Like a grand Cosmic armchair quarterback, looking back it can explain everything as that was in its being, but predicts nothing as any variance in the theory is explained by a declaring a new universal. The theory that explains everything and predicts nothing a priori is neither True nor False, but Nonsense and has nothing to do with the scientific method. Be glad you did have to face D'Souza, he would chewed you up and spit you out. You would have to create a new existence to explain it. |
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