The lawsuit alleges that companies have violated a state law passed in 1986 requiring companies to provide warnings before exposing people to known carcinogens or reproductive toxins.
In 2002, scientists found potatoes and other starchy foods cooked at high temperatures contained low levels of acrylamide. Other studies have discounted the potential toxicity of acrylamide to humans...
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is studying the impact of acrylamide levels in food. In a March press release, the FDA said "acrylamide can cause cancer in laboratory animals at high doses, although it is not clear whether it causes cancer in humans at the much lower levels found in food."
Evolutionary Psychology By Diana Hsieh @ 9:39 AM
Paul recently pointed me to this article on emerging criticisms of evolutionary psychology. Although I've not studied the subject in great depth, my general understanding of what I have read (mostly for an undergraduate course on "The Biological Foundations of Human Behavior") is that the subject fundamentally rests upon the arbitrary rationalizations of "Just So Stories" coupled with the falsehood of genetic determinism. As the article indicates, I doubt that even its model of the brain as modular-by-genes is correct.
However, I'm open to hearing an Objectivist case for evolutionary psychology -- if such is possible. I'm particularly concerned with the apparent conflict between the fact of human volition and the explanations for human behavior offered by evolutionary psychology. I'd also love pointers to articles that a defender of evolutionary psychology regards as good science untainted by bad philosophy.
Genetic Lies By Diana Hsieh @ 8:35 AM
Virginia Postrel recent posted an interesting bit on parents concealing their use of donated eggs from their resulting children, including its ramifications for political debates about paying egg donors.
Somewhat to my surprise, I'm fairly sympathetic to such concealment, so long as it doesn't involve any active deception. In general, I regard the modern concern for "biological parents" as bordering on deterministic obsession. Sure, it's nice to know the source of your physical characteristics. (Personally, I'm blessed with my mother's crooked fingers and my father's bad feet. Paul often informs me that if he had known about these substantial defects earlier, he never would have married me!) And it's sometimes helpful to know your family's medical history. Yet those considerations hardly explain all the fuss over genetic parents.
In particular, I'm baffled by adopted children who desperately pursue their genetic parents. They often do so against the explicit wishes of those genetic parents. Or they claim to love and respect the real parents who chose to raise them, yet end up calling their genetic parents "Mom" and "Dad." Such people often don't seem to regard the real parents who raised them as their real parents. I even remember one person -- someone I barely knew -- blurting out that she was adopted when she mentioned her parents in the course of casual conversation. It was unnerving.
Perhaps such people aren't as happy with the adopted parents as they claim to be, even if not abused or neglected. They wonder whether their life would have been better with their genetic parents. Perhaps they regard themselves as fundamentally deficient due to rejection by the very people who were supposed to love and care for them. They might have been told about the adoption when too young to understand its actual meaning. Perhaps the focus on biological parents is merely a manifestation of general psychological problems like insecurity and self-doubt. Those psychological problems would surely emerge in other ways if the child wasn't aware of the egg/sperm donation or adoption.
In any case, I don't wish to trivialize the damage that a parent can do by lying to a child about his genetic parents. If a child notices that he looks different from his family, his parents ought to be willing to tell him why. To conceal it is to undermine a child's trust in his parents and confidence in his own judgment. However, today's near-obsession with genetic ancestry is probably less than healthy for all concerned.
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Monday, August 29, 2005
Aristotle's Catfish By Diana Hsieh @ 9:22 PM
A few days ago, I was searching the wonderfully helpful Non-Contradiction.com for the source text of Aristotle's distinctions between first potentiality (e.g. "I am the sort of being that is able to learn Russian"), second potentiality/first actuality (e.g. "I am able to speak Russian, but I am not presently doing so"), and second actuality (e.g. "I am presently speaking Russian") for my paper on the marginal humans argument for animal liberation/rights. (Really, it's quite relevant!) In the process, I surfed to this page on Aristotle's Catfish. I'd heard the basic outline of the story from someone some time ago, but so I was delighted to read the details about this vindication of Aristotle's biology. However, I was even more delighted to see that the first of the two listed sources was none other than "'Aristotle as Scientist' lecture given by Dr. Allan Gotthelf, August 1989" -- with the link to the Ayn Rand Bookstore.
(Obviously, that lecture is still on my "To Do" list -- now bumped up a few notches! Unfortunately, it's not yet available on CD. Since I've discovered the joyful ease of listening to lectures on my iPod, I don't wish to buy any more tapes.)
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Sunday, August 28, 2005
Medical Education By Paul @ 10:15 PM
In the comments section, Marnie recently asked,
What is Paul's specialty please? How many years out of school is he? Does he still recommend the business? [I start post-bac pre-med classes in 3 weeks.]
In response to Marnie's questions:
1) My field is diagnostic radiology, with subspecialty interests in trauma/emergency radiology and orthopedic radiology.
2) My education consisted of 4-years college (i.e., pre-med), 4 years medical school, one year laboratory research at the NIH (National Institutes of Health) in Bethesda MD, 4 years residency in diagnostic radiology, and one year of additional clinical fellowship training in MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) with emphasis in advanced orthopedic radiology.
Since then, I've been in practice for 11 years, both as a faculty member at the Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis (3 years) as well as 8 years of private practice (3 years in San Diego, and 5 years now in Denver.)
3) I still recommend the field provided that one finds the actual science and art of medicine interesting in their own right. In that case, the various b*llsh*t elements related to government regulations are tolerable, at least for the time being.
I personally find the field intellectually fascinating. Plus the technology is advancing at an exciting pace.
During my daily practice, I get to deal with people who are for the most part very rational (at least with respect to work), goal-directed, and efficacious. Most of my day is a constant use of reason (both induction and deduction), applied directly to issues of ultimate value, namely another person's life. In terms of job satisfaction, it's hard to beat this combination.
Since a lot of people don't know exactly what a modern radiologist does, I thought I'd explain in a little bit more detail what I do and what I like about my job.
There's nothing I enjoy more than solving a diagnostic mystery by taking a set of subtle and apparently disconnected findings from a patient's x-rays, CAT scans, and MRI's, and integrating them in order to arrive at a correct diagnosis.
Similarly, I enjoy performing invasive radiology procedures (so-called "interventional radiology") where I use real-time x-ray imaging to guide a needle to a target within a patient's body (avoiding all the critical nerves and blood vessels), in order to either perform a biopsy or deliver a dose of medication to exactly the right spot in as pain-free and safe a fashion as humanly possible.
Advances in imaging technology allow radiologists to perform procedures in the x-ray suite that 20 years ago would have required much riskier open surgery. Interventional radiology is like playing a video game, but where the stakes are much higher (as are the rewards).
Colorado is a very outdoors-oriented state, and hence a lot of people enjoy activities like skiing, snowboarding, mountain biking, rock-climing, etc. Hence, if you were to take a bad fall on the ski slopes at Aspen or Vail and hurt your knee, it would be me who would interpret your MRI scan and tell your orthopedic surgeon which structures were torn and which were ok.
Or if you were to get into a bad car accident in the middle of the night and were helicoptered to our Level 1 trauma hospital, it would be me who would read your emergency CAT scans and tell the trauma surgeons which organs were critically injured and needed immediate repair, which were less critically injured (and still needed attention, but not immediately), and which structures were ok.
I think I have one of the coolest jobs in the world. It was a long road to get to the point of being able to practice independently as full-fledged board-certified physician, but it was well worth it in the end.
Medicine is an extremely varied field, and there is a branch of medicine that should suit nearly any personality type. For instance, some people enjoy high-pressure specialities that require quick-decision making skills like trauma surgery, whereas other people like slower paced puzzle-solving fields like pediatric endocrinology. Some people enjoy fields with a lot of patient contact like family practice, others prefer fields with minimal patient contact like pathology. Hence, Marnie, you should be able find a field that suits your interests and temperament.
I wish you much success and happiness in your studies, Marnie. If you have any further questions about medical education, I'd be happy to answer them, either here or via e-mail.
Three "Keynote" Speakers By Diana Hsieh @ 9:09 PM
This spring, Boulder's "Rocky Mountain Student Philosophy Conference" will have not one but three keynote speakers:
Linda Martin Alcoff is Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies and the Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence at Syracuse University. She received her Ph.D. from Brown University in 1987. Linda Martin Alcoff works primarily in continental philosophy, epistemology, feminist theory, and philosophy of race. Her books include Feminist Epistemologies (Routledge, 1993), Thinking From the Underside of History (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell), Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory of Knowledge (Cornell, 1996), Identities (Blackwell, 2002). She has written over forty articles concerning Foucault, sexual violence, the politics of knowledge, and gender and race identity, and is at work on a new book forthcoming with Oxford entitled Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self. She has served as Co-Director of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and Chair of the APA Committee on Hispanics.
Claudia Card received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard University and is Emma Goldman Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she is also Affiliate Professor in Jewish Studies, LGBT Studies, Women's Studies, and Environmental Studies. She is author of The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford, 2002), The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral Luck (Temple 1996), Lesbian Choices (Columbia 1995), and more than 100 articles and reviews; editor of Feminist Ethics (Kansas 1991), Adventures in Lesbian Philosophy (Indiana 1994), The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir (Cambridge, 2003), On Feminist Ethics and Politics (Kansas 1999), and a special issue of Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy (1992). She has delivered over 100 papers at conferences, colleges and universities and has been featured in 10 radio broadcasts.
Uma Narayan received her B.A. in Philosophy from Bombay University and her M.A. in Philosophy from Poona University, India. She received her Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1990. She is a Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College. She is the author of Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism. She has coedited Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives with Prof. Mary L. Shanley, Having and Raising Children with Prof. Julia Bartkowiak and Decentering the Center: Postcolonial and Feminist Challenges to Philosophy with Prof. Sandra Harding. She regularly offers courses on Contemporary Moral Issues, Social and Political Philosophy and Feminist Theory in the philosophy department. She frequently teaches courses for the Women's Studies program, such as Introduction to Women's Studies and Global Feminism.
On a related note, you might think that I named this blog "NoodleFood" based upon the idea that it offers "Philosophical Food for Your Noodle!" However, I think it's time for me to confess my up-to-now secret worship of the Flying Spaghetti Monster. NoodleFood is actually my daily sacrificial offering to the His Noodliness; my unworthy words feed him. So, I hereby declare my total agreement with Bobby Henderson's open letter to the Kansas School Board: If Intelligent Design is to be taught in government schools, then FSM-ism ought to be taught too.
Given that the libertarian movement embraces a diversity of philosophic foundations for liberty, it's hardly surprising to find increasing disagreement about political issues amongst libertarians. I keep an eye out for these disputes, as they make handy talking points when I explain why I'm not a libertarian. Some well-known and standard ones include whether governments necessarily violate rights, whether abortion is murder, whether a defensive war violates the rights of innocents in the aggressing country, whether law should be legislated, whether intellectual property rights exist, whether using my absent neighbor's hose to put out the fire consuming his house violates his rights, and so on. So here's another: libertarian animal rights. Although these rights-for-beasts libertarians are not terribly common at present, they seem to be growing in number. (As a happy coincidence, I'm presently writing a paper on the errors of the argument from marginal humans discussed in that essay. Don Watkins' essay on broken units helped me sort out significant confusions about species normality, I should mention.)
The Charlotte Observer has a short article on BB&T Bank's recent one million dollar donation to UNC Charlotte's College of Business. Happily, Objectivist businessman extraordinaire John Allison has been very successful selling this "moral foundations of capitalism" package to business schools.
I'm quite amused by Dennis Hardin's recent SOLO article "Nathaniel Branden vs. Ayn Rand on Morality." Hardin does not merely fail to anywhere mention that the whole essay is a response to my recent post "Nathaniel Branden's Campaign Against Objective Moral Judgment." He also borders on plagiarism by copying the structure and even lifting some text from my post. He does mention me in passing, but not even by name. He just writes -- totally out of the blue and toward the very end -- that "one observer contends that Branden espouses this notion with the hope others might want to 'take responsibility for his [i.e., Branden's] moral depravity.'" The included link is not even to the relevant post, but to August's huge monthly archive.
Just by way of contrast, I clearly identified and linked to all of Nathaniel Branden's relevant writings in my post. I even explicitly defended that practice as necessary against a stupid, dishonest troll on Objectivism Online -- on the grounds that my readers need to judge the fairness and accuracy of my criticisms for themselves. I'm not afraid that honest readers will reject my criticisms if also given easy access to the primary sources. Dennis Hardin doesn't seem so confident -- and rightly so. Also, the voluminous comments on Hardin's essay are informative: they show an almost universal lack of concern for Ayn Rand's actual views on moral judgment from these supposed "Sense of Life Objectivists."
I have just a few more days to finish up my flurry on posts on the various false friends of Objectivism. Yikes! (I've set myself a deadline of August 31st, as I don't want it drag on and on forever.) Although working through these issues in writing has been very helpful to me, I'm looking forward to focusing on more positive philosophical concerns.
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The basic theme of his talk is that someone who holds the "right" conclusions but for the wrong reasons (i.e., based on the wrong philosophic foundations) actually holds the wrong ideas, despite any superficial agreement with someone who holds the "same" right ideas for the right reasons (i.e., based on the right philosophy). He devotes the lecture to developing and defending this argument, and I won't repeat it all here.
During the Q&A period, two people asked him about subjectivism and the Austrian school of economics. I've transcribed his responses as faithfully as possible, making only minor editing changes (for clarity, and to eliminating words like "um"). Here is what he said:
That's a good question. You ask how do I reconcile my disagreement - my rejection of subjectivism philosophically -- with the Austrian school of economics which has a lot of good things to say in defense of capitalism but is basically founded philosophically on subjectivism. Well, that's a good question. And I would distinguish these two things.
To the extent that the Austrian school of economics, or any school of thought, actually derives their views from subjectivism, those views -- you can't do much with those views. Those views don't mean anything. You can't validate those views. You can't justify them. You can't give logical reasons for them because if they really are dependent on subjectivism, subjectivism means whatever I say is just as good as whatever you say. So who am I to say that, "The law of supply and demand works"; you say, "Well, I don't think it works."
The point is that I don't think they really are subjectivist - philosophically subjectivist -- through and through. There are elements of subjectivism that actually undercuts a good deal of what they say. But if you look at even Mises for example, who is openly over and over a champion of subjectivism nominally - he on the other hand constantly upholds individualism, he upholds absolute principles, he upholds the laws of logic, at times let's say.
Now a subjectivist could do none of this. There's an internal inconsistency. And I think that Mises and others are correct in their economic views despite their (in spite of their) subjectivist orientation, not because of it. And they're not consistently applying their philosophy of subjectivism. It's to the extent that they're deviating from the logical implications of subjectivism - it's to that extent that they're correct and they have very good things to say. And you therefore can incorporate that into a proper philosophic foundation like Objectivism.
To the extent, however, that they do follow the implications of subjectivism, they go off in all kinds of bizarre directions. Dr. Ridpath can give you some good examples of that if you ask him at the break... That's basically my answer.
.....
Someone like Hayek for example -- I do not regard Hayek as a defender of capitalism.
I regard Mises as a defender of capitalism. And the reason is that Hayek consistently applies the philosophy that forms the context for his conclusions.
Mises does not; Mises is mixed. That is, Mises has an explicitly subjectivist philosophy but an implicit rational philosophy to a certain extent. It is that implicit philosophy that he relies on without naming it explicitly as the basis for his views.
So for example, I don't think it's conceivable that somebody could be an arch-defender of the individual against government, I don't see how somebody could be a defender of (or even a definer of) property rights as against state intervention. You could not do that unless you had an implicitly individualistic philosophy, which itself requires an implicitly objective approach to reality. The problem is that he doesn't explicitly realize it, and he's torn in a conflict. And the good things about him I think follow from his implicit philosophy and the bad things from his explicit. But I would not say, and I'm glad you raised that question, because I did not mean to say that, "Well yes, he's a subjectivist but he came up with good things, so it's ok anyways".
To the extent that subjectivism forms the context for his conclusions, he is wrong. The point is that it often is *not* the basis for his conclusion even though he mistakenly sometimes thinks it is.
I've read very little Hayek and Von Mises, so I can't comment on Schwartz's analysis of those two particular cases. But I think he makes some very interesting general points about implicit vs. explicit philosophy, and how someone can therefore be advocating the right ideas if they are derived from a good implicit philosophy, despite a bad explicit philosophy.
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DEAR ABBY: I live in a family-oriented neighborhood. My problem is my next-door neighbor flies his gay pride flag in his front yard. Because we have a lot of families with young children who do not need to be subjected to that kind of thing, I have asked him numerous times to remove it.
His response is it's a free country and he does not subject anybody to his lifestyle.
I strongly feel that in a neighborhood devoted to children's morals and the way life should be, he should not be allowed to have that flag in his front yard for everyone to see. I threatened if he didn't take it down, I'd call the police. I feel it's harming the children to see that flag flying, especially on a busy street that everyone travels on. What should I do? -- RIGHTEOUS IN NEW CASTLE, PA.
Oh, who cares a jot about personal freedom when the morals of children are at stake?!? (What thin and brittle morals those must be, if they are undermined by the mere sight of a flag!)
Abby replied well enough:
DEAR RIGHTEOUS: First of all, calm down. Your neighbor is hurting no one, and "young children" will not understand what the flag symbolizes. Unless there are codes, covenants or restrictions in your neighborhood governing the display of flags, your neighbor has a right to hoist his banner. Rather than picking a fight about something so insignificant, you should concentrate on cultivating your own garden and stop obsessing about what's going on in his.
The neighborhood might have covenant restrictions on the display of flags, but I doubt that they require homeowners to be "devoted to children's morals and the way life should be" in the fashion of Mr. Righteous.
Teaching Dishonesty By Diana Hsieh @ 7:21 AM
Dave Jilk must be trying to ruin the peaceful tranquility of my life. Why else would he send me a link to this horrible article on the supposed necessity of teaching children to lie?!? The title is awful all by itself: "Say 'Thank You': Learning How To Lie." The article -- or rather news release of a psychological study -- is much worse. See for yourself:
Although honesty is generally taught as the best policy, around a child's birthday and holidays, the little white lie goes a long way. After all, kids are expected to grin and giggle at an itchy wool sweater as if it were the toy-of-the-moment they had been begging for. After a few years of awkward laughter and whispered scolding from parents, children tend to learn that a forced exclamation of joy earns them more smiles and hugs than the truth does.
Although this landmark on the way to knowing the difference between making grandma happy and making grandma really happy may seem of no use outside the living room, research published in the May 2005 issue of Psychological Science, a journal of the American Psychological Society, shows that there is a strong connection between a preschool child's reaction to an unwanted present and their ability to control other reactive behavior.
In a study funded by the National Institute of Mental Health and Texas A&M University, researchers Jessica E. Kieras, Renee M. Tobin, William G. Graziano, and Mary K. Rothbart found that children's ability to put on a happy face when faced with a gift of an unattractive baby rattle was shown to predict their knowledge of the often-unspoken rules of acceptable behavior in society. The results speak to a child's potential to develop "socially appropriate expressive behavior" and a visibly even temperament, according to the authors.
Children ranging in age from 3 to 5 years were asked how much they liked each toy in a set, and following their assessment, received either their favorite or least favorite toy of the set. After each child received their toy, the tester gauged the child's response based on several observed reactions, including smiling, surprise, disappointment, disgust, and anger.
In order to relate these results to what society tells us about polite behavior, the children were then given a series of small tasks to perform, such as drawing a line at an unnaturally slow speed or holding down a pinball lever for extended lengths of time. The results of these simple tasks demonstrated the children's level of ability to overcome their reactive instincts and fit their actions to suit the needs of their situation - a skill learned throughout childhood and of limitless importance in the adult world.
The results were not altogether surprising. "Children who performed well on behavioral measures of effortful control displayed similar amounts of positive affect after receiving desirable and undesirable gifts, whereas children scoring low on effortful control showed more positive affect after receiving the desirable gift than after receiving the undesirable gift," the authors wrote. The children who were able to react similarly to the toy they wanted and the toy they didn't want were more able to comply with the regulations of the performance tests. So parents, keep nudging your kids to smile and say thank you; it may help them get that date, job, or house a few years down the line.
The researchers' delighted exhortation to dishonesty for the sake of tact is pretty disturbing. Politeness does not demand deception, as Miss Manners understands. Yet instead of pausing for a moment of serious thought about the matter, as any good parent would, these psychologists rush to find some quasi-scientific rationalization for the notion that life requires lies.
And that's not even the worst of it!
Their quasi-scientific rationalization for dishonesty wholly depends upon the idea that social conformity is an unqualified good. So functioning as an adult does not require a child to learn to use his reason properly to gain knowledge of reality, but only to accommodate himself to the malleable world of other people's perceptions, emotions, and expectations.
2005 Beloit College Mindset List By Paul @ 10:25 PM
"In the coming weeks, millions of students will be entering college for the first time. On average, these members of the Class of 2009 will be 18 years old, which means they were born in 1987...
1. Andy Warhol, Liberace, Jackie Gleason, and Lee Marvin have always been dead. 2. They don't remember when "cut and paste" involved scissors. 3. Heart-lung transplants have always been possible. 4. Wayne Gretzky never played for Edmonton. 5. Boston has been working on the "The Big Dig" all their lives. 6. With little need to practice, most of them do not know how to tie a tie. 7. Pay-Per-View television has always been an option. 8. They never had the fun of being thrown into the back of a station wagon with six others. 9. Iran and Iraq have never been at war with each other. 10. They are more familiar with Greg Gumbel than with Bryant Gumbel. 11. Philip Morris has always owned Kraft Foods. 12. Al-Qaida has always existed with Osama bin Laden at its head. 13. They learned to count with Lotus 1-2-3. 14. Car stereos have always rivaled home component systems. 15. Jimmy Swaggart and Jim Bakker have never preached on television. 16. Voice mail has always been available. 17. "Whatever" is not part of a question but an expression of sullen rebuke. 18. The federal budget has always been more than a trillion dollars. 19. Condoms have always been advertised on television. 20. They may have fallen asleep playing with their Gameboys in the crib. 21. They have always had the right to burn the flag. 22. For daily caffeine emergencies, Starbucks has always been around the corner. 23. Ferdinand Marcos has never been in charge of the Philippines. 24. Money put in their savings account the year they were born earned almost 7% interest. 25. Bill Gates has always been worth at least a billion dollars. 26. Dirty dancing has always been acceptable. 27. Southern fried chicken, prepared with a blend of 11 herbs and spices, has always been available in China. 28. Michael Jackson has always been bad, and greed has always been good. 29. The Starship Enterprise has always looked dated. 30. Pixar has always existed. 31. There has never been a "fairness doctrine" at the FCC. 32. Judicial appointments routinely have been "Borked." 33. Aretha Franklin has always been in the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame. 34. There have always been zebra mussels in the Great Lakes. 35. Police have always been able to search garbage without a search warrant. 36. It has always been possible to walk from England to mainland Europe on dry land. 37. They have grown up in a single superpower world. 38. They missed the oat bran diet craze. 39. American Motors has never existed. 40. Scientists have always been able to see supernovas. 41. Les Miserables has always been on stage. 42. Halogen lights have always been available at home, with a warning. 43. "Baby M" may be a classmate, and contracts with surrogate mothers have always been legal. 44. RU486, the "morning after pill," has always been on the market. 45. There has always been a pyramid in front of the Louvre in Paris. 46. British Airways has always been privately owned. 47. Irradiated food has always been available but controversial. 48. Snowboarding has always been a popular winter pastime. 49. Libraries have always been the best centers for computer technology and access to good software. 50. Biosphere 2 has always been trying to create a revolution in the life sciences. 51. The Hubble Telescope has always been focused on new frontiers. 52. Researchers have always been looking for stem cells. 53. They do not remember "a kinder and gentler nation." 54. They never saw the shuttle Challenger fly. 55. The TV networks have always had cable partners. 56. Airports have always had upscale shops and restaurants. 57. Black Americans have always been known as African-Americans. 58. They never saw Pat Sajak or Arsenio Hall host a late night television show. 59. Matt Groening has always had a Life in Hell. 60. Salman Rushdie has always been watching over his shoulder. 61. Digital cameras have always existed. 62. Tom Landry never coached the Cowboys. 63. Time Life and Warner Communications have always been joined. 64. CNBC has always been on the air. 65. The Field of Dreams has always been drawing people to Iowa. 66. They never saw a Howard Johnson's with 28 ice cream flavors. 67. Reindeer at Christmas have always distinguished between secular and religious decorations. 68. Entertainment Weekly has always been on the newsstand. 69. Lyme Disease has always been a ticking concern in the woods. 70. Jimmy Carter has always been an elder statesman. 71. Miss Piggy and Kermit have always dwelt in Disneyland. 72. America's Funniest Home Videos has always been on television. 73. Their nervous new parents heard C. Everett Koop proclaim nicotine as addictive as heroin. 74. Lever has always been looking for 2000 parts to clean. 75. They have always been challenged to distinguish between news and entertainment on cable TV.
I'm quite serious about socialist medicine meaning the enslavement of doctors. If our government ever voted itself control over our health care, doctors would not be permitted to practice medicine except under the terms dictated by government bureaucrats. My husband would be told what treatments he could offer, what equipment he could buy, what fees he could charge, which patients he can or must accept, and so on. If any of his patients wanted to pay him more for some safe and effective treatment unacceptable to the government, he could not offer it. (He would be exploiting their need!) If too many doctors refuse to work under those conditions -- as I know Paul would -- the government could follow the lead of Pennsylvania by requiring doctors to ask for permission to quit, retire, or move to another state. Of course, some doctors would welcome socialist medicine, but such happy slaves are still slaves.
Given the well-known disasters of socialist medicine -- like ever-rising costs, long waits for diagnosis and treatment, substantial lags in technology, treatments not offered, and so on -- for an intellectual to pretend that "universal health care" would simply extend our high standard of medical care to all is inexcusable.
Certainly, much is wrong with our current health care system. Yet all the serious, chronic problems are rooted in our decades of government intervention. The government has substantially distorted the market with its massive regulatory schemes and ever-expanding welfare programs. For example, the unprecedented use of employer-provided health insurance to cover normal, expected medical expenses is a direct consequence of government wage freezes during World War II. For example, since insurance companies determine their payments based upon the arbitrary fee schedule of Medicare, doctors are paid very poorly for reading those all-important mammograms, even though they assume a huge malpractice risk in doing so. The solution to these kinds of problems is to eliminate the source government intervention, not to increase it.
My mood was slightly improved upon re-reading Leonard Peikoff's excellent essay "Health Care is Not a Right". Altruism, collectivism, and statism drive the engine of change for socialist medicine -- and so the battle must be fought in moral terms. Economic arguments about the practical effects of socialist medicine are a helpful adjunct, but by themselves, they lapse into absurd irrelevance.
And although he's most definitely not an Objectivist, he has been a featured speaker at The Objectivist Center Summer Seminars in 1995 and 1999.
Both Diana and I have heard him lecture in the past, and he's an very clear and compelling public speaker. He's an extremely intelligent man, and one of the leading intellectuals of the modern libertarian movement.
Libertarians need not choose between moral rights and consequences because theirs is a political, not a moral philosophy; one that can be shown to be compatible with various moral theories, which as we shall see is one source of its appeal. Moral theories based on either moral rights or on consequentialism purport to be "comprehensive," insofar as they apply to all moral questions to the exclusion of all other moral theories. Although the acceptance of one of these moral theories entails the rejection of all others, libertarian moral rights philosphers such as Eric Mack, Loren Lomasky, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl on the one hand, and utilitarians such as Jan Narveson on the other can embrace libertarian political theory with equal fervor. (Page 6 of PDF file.)
This is as clear and explicit a severing of the link between ethics and politics as one can ask for. Of course, Objectivists will completely disagree with this approach, because the Objectivist politics flows directly from its moral theory.
In fact, Barnett revels in the fact the libertarian politics can be defended by both "moral rights" theorists and "consequentialists" (e.g., utilitarians). He states,
...[I]f both methods tend to reach the same results in entirely different ways, then each method can provide an analytic check on the other. Because any of our analytic methods may err or may be used to deceive, we can use one method to confirm the results that appear to be supported by the other. Analogously, after adding a column of figures from top to bottom, we sometimes double check the sum by adding the figures again from bottom to top or by using a calculator. Just as we rely upon institutional rivalries between branches of government to protect against error and deception, we may rely upon "conceptual rivalries" between different methods of normative inquiry for the same reason...(Pages 6-7.)
Of course, if Objectivists reject the validity of these various alternative philosophical foundations to ethics (such as utilitarianism or consequentialism), does the fact that these theories lead to the same political conclusions really add any certainty? In Barnett's view it does, whereas I must disagree.
There's a huge difference between double-checking one's conclusions by testing them via multiple correct methods (which are based on the same underlying principles and give the same results for the same problems) vs. testing them via multiple incorrect methods (where the underlying principles are divergent from the start and yield radically different results when applied to very simple problems).
Hence (to extends Barnett's analogy), using incorrect and incompatible philosophical methods to double-check the correctness of one's final conclusions would be comparable to double-checking one's arithmetic by using three different broken calculators. If those results happened to agree, would that really give one more confidence in the correctness of the answer, if one already knows that the calculators are unreliable?
(Also, note the implied skepticism in "our analytic methods may err" and the adoption of the equivalent of the "coherence theory of truth" by appealing to agreement between incompatible methodologies to validate one's conclusions.)
Finally, Barnett states,
While neither denying morality nor adopting a relativist moral stance, Libertarian political theory transcends different conflicting approaches to morality... Libertarians seek a political theory that could be accepted by persons of diverse approaches living together and interacting in what Hayek called the Great Society. (Pages 23-24.)
In other words, this pluralistic or "Big Tent" approach to morality is one of the explicit goals of libertarians, not just an incidental outcome. In my experience, most avowed libertarians are not explicitly subjectivist, in the sense of altogether denying any need for a moral foundation for their political views. But they do adopt this more subtle form of methodological subjectivism, namely the position that underlying moral views are unimportant as long as one supports "liberty" as a political goal.
If one agrees with Objectivists that a proper political theory must be grounded in a proper moral theory, then the libertarian approach is anathema.
On the other hand, if one thinks that holding the correct moral theory is unimportant (and that any one of a number of incorrect and philosphically incompatible moral theories can lead to the correct political philosophy), then this is a direct rejection of the Objectivist approach to epistemology, which states that truth can only be arrived at by a process of reason applied to the facts of reality, integrated with respect for proper context and hierarchy. (This is covered much more extensively in Leonard Peikoff's book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.)
As an aside, the folks at the TOC have long been aware of the problems with Barnett's views and the fact that they are incompatible with the principles of Objectivism. In 1998, Eyal Mozes (in my opinion, one of the best of the TOC-aligned thinkers) wrote a review of Barnett's book The Structure of Liberty for the TOC Navigator magazine. In his review "Must Politics Rest On Morality?", Mozes correctly criticized Barnett for failing to "defend liberal justice and the rule of law independently of a specific ethical foundation".
Furthermore, Barnett is an explicit anarchist. As Mozes noted,
Barnett argues against what he calls the "Single Power Principle," the principle that the retaliatory use of force must be in the hands of a monopoly organization, i.e., a government. Barnett objects to the "single power principle" on two grounds: (a) enforcing a monopoly on the use of force violates the right of freedom of contract, for those who wish to contract for private use of force to enforce justice and the rule of law; and (b) acceptance of the single power principle makes the problem of enforcement abuse insoluble.
As an alternative, Barnett argues that the effective way to address the problem of enforcement abuse is by a "polycentric constitutional order," with multiple private agencies competing in two separate functions: the power to adjudicate disputes; and the power to enforce the laws, with each law-enforcement agency choosing the body of law that it will enforce. Agencies in both these areas would be required to adhere to "the competition principle": "Law-enforcement and adjudicative agencies should not be able to put their competitors out of business by force" (Barnett, p. 258).
Of the logical problems I see in Barnett's position, perhaps the most glaring is that "the competition principle" is self-contradictory. If law-enforcement agency A adopted a body of law that forbids other agencies from operating, and then tried to enforce its law by forcibly closing law-enforcement agency B, it would be in violation of "the competition principle"; but if agency B tried to defend itself, then it would be trying to forcibly prevent agency A from carrying out its business and enforcing its laws, so B would then itself be violating "the competition principle." Barnett never addresses this logical problem. In a chapter devoted to a projection of how a polycentric constitutional order would operate, he describes a scenario in which corruption in one private agency is discovered by the other agencies, and the agency is then forcibly put out of business; he never considers how this scenario can be reconciled with "the competition principle."
Yet these issues (i.e., his anarchism and his subjectivist defense of liberty) did not stop the TOC from inviting Barnett back as a speaker a year later in 1999; in fact, this was part of the TOC's deliberate outreach to the non-Objectivist libertarian community.
Now to the best of my knowledge, Barnett has never claimed to be an Objectivist, and he has always been fully open and honest about his philosophical views. Hence his inclusion at a conference supposedly devoted to Objectivism should not be regarded as his fault, but instead the fault of the sponsoring organization.
And as a final footnote, when Diana was a TA for the undergraduate Applied Ethics class last semester at University of Colorado, one of the professor's assigned readings was Barnett's article on criminal justice entitled "Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice", in which Barnett argues that the primary purpose of the criminal justice system should be restitution for the victim, and that it should specifically not concern itself with punishing the criminal per se.
This is of course, in direct opposition to the Objectivist concept of the purpose of criminal justice. As Don Watkins nicely summarized,
A man who commits a crime against one individual is thereby an objective threat to society as a whole. Society, as represented by the government, therefore has every interest and every right to punish him. The government's aim here is not simply to restore health to the victim, but to inflict painful consequences on the perpetrator: to force him to experience the painful effects of the causes he enacted. Writes Rand:
The law should: a. correct the consequences of the crime in regard to the victim, whenever possible (such as recovering stolen property and returning it to the owner); b. impose restraints on the criminal, such as a jail sentence, not in order to reform him, but in order to make him bear the painful consequences of his action (or the equivalent) which he inflicted on his victims; c. make the punishment proportionate to the crime in the full context of all the legally punishable crimes (Rand, Letters of Ayn Rand, 559).
(Emphasis mine, not Don's or Rand's).
In summary: Modern libertarians deny the need for the proper philosophical foundation for their politics. This is explictly stated in the works of respected libertarian scholars such as Randy Barnett. Because of the subjectivism inherent in this "Big Tent" approach, the logical consequence is that libertarians will be drawn to any number of conclusions which will be diverge significantly from the Objectivist political and legal philosophy (as well as from each others'). As one example, Barnett is a defender of anarchism and he also rejects the need to punish criminals for their bad actions. Other libertarians may disagree with Barnett on those particular conclusions, but will diverge from the Objectivist position on other important issues (such as intellectual property rights). Yet all are welcome under the rubric of "libertarian", and are regarded as defenders of liberty.
Hence, anyone who believes that libertarianism and Objectivism are compatible (for example those who agree with Nathaniel Branden's article "Objectivism and Libertarianism" in which he argues "Folks, we are all libertarians now; might as well get used to it") would be well-advised to re-examine their views.
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Blast from the Past By Diana Hsieh @ 11:47 AM
Paul and I first met in St. Louis on this day eleven years ago -- August 23rd, 1994. Earlier that spring, he wrote me a fairly long e-mail about my post to alt.philosophy.objectivism on "intellectual activism." At the time, he was finishing up his MRI fellowship in Los Angeles, while I was a freshman at WashU. He moved to St. Louis a few months later for a job as an attending physician at WashU's teaching hospital. When I returned to WashU in the late summer for the start of my sophomore year, we met for dinner. (Back then, he had uber-dorky glasses, but a cool new BMW.)
Paul was my only Objectivism-interested friend in all my years in St. Louis. Although he agreed with much of the philosophy, he wasn't an Objectivist. I remember many, many arguments about his representationalism and compatibilism. We had a fairly regular weekly ritual in which I'd cook us dinner on Thursday night, then he'd take me out for a fancy meal over the weekend.
After those three years in St. Louis, we both moved to California at about the same time. He took a job in San Diego, while I moved to Los Angeles. (That's when he introduced me to his good friends Cliff and Alexa Brett.) Given the two-hour proximity, we still saw each other fairly regularly.
During all these years, we were just buddies. Given the thirteen-year age gap, neither of us even thought about dating. While I was still in college, my mother would sometimes ask me "Why don't you date Paul?" I'd tell her that she was crazy, since he was so old!
In November of 1998, after much soul-searching and with much trepidation, I decided to ask Paul if he wanted to date. I did so during what was just supposed to be an ordinary visit between friends, for all he knew. He was quite stunned, even speechless for a time. (Paul is often quiet, but never speechless!) He almost said no -- I swear. (He'd seen too many of my other relationships not go so well!)
As you've probably guessed, he did agree to give it a try. Three months later, I moved to San Diego. We became engaged a few days later, then married three months and three days after that. So after more than four years of friendship, it took us just six months to be married!
To celebrate this small anniversary, I've posted my original a.p.o post on intellectual activism and Paul's e-mail reply to me below. It was our first contact, so to speak. For reasons that will become obvious as you read, I cannot possibly endorse all that I wrote those many years ago. (My disagreements concern more than the mentions of David Kelley and Nathaniel Branden, but those are the most significant.) Similarly, please don't presume that Paul agrees with all that he wrote back then -- although I am struck by the continuity of his intellectual interests.
This is an article that I wrote up for Vixie's Objectivism list that I figured I would post here as well. A thanks goes to Eric Barnhill for straightening out lots of convoluted sentences. Comments are more than welcome.
-------------------------------- In order to 'survive' in the realm of ideas, every philosophy needs proponents, individuals actively advocating its principles and persuading others of its validity. Without any advocates, a school of thought will have no effect whatsoever. Without converts, the philosophy will shortly disappear, probably never to be recovered.
In this regard, Objectivism is no different from any other philosophy, but Objectivists have two distinct advantages over the proponents of all other philosophies. First and foremost, Objectivism is true. This advantage is unprecedented; no other philosophy can compete with Objectivism on this level. Second, Objectivism precludes any sacrifice by its supporters for 'the cause'; rather individual self-interest determines the level of intellectual activism. An Objectivist will be philosophically active to the extent of his understanding of the import of philosophy to his life and of his available mental and physical resources. The excitement and passion that inevitably flows from this awareness cannot be matched by anyone who dully advocates an idea out of duty. But advocating unpopular ideas in a hostile culture is hardly easy; the resulting psychological drain stemming can be overwhelming to bear alone. This is one reason why it is crucial that Objectivists have the emotional support of friends, for friendship can easily counteract the oft-encountered rancor.
***
Yet the recognition of the value of actively advocating Objectivism does not tell us how to best pursue this value. We must be reasonably sure that our actions will be efficacious before we debate. We can neither lose sight of the fact that most people have given up on our intellectual leaders and even on ideas themselves, nor can we ignore the widespread misconceptions about Ayn Rand's philosophy. In short, we must be sure that our methods are sound and also appropriate to our audience's context of knowledge.
First, Objectivists must stress the crucial role that philosophy plays in the life of every individual. The fact that there are answers to be found, answers of life and death importance, must be (at least) implicit in every philosophical discussion. Understanding the power of philosophy in the lives of individuals is necessary *before* an individual can understand the relevance of Objectivism to his life. The question that Eric Barnhill raised about how to convince other admirers of Rand to get "firmly grounded in philosophy" is troublesome, and only means to this end seems to be offering lots of inductive evidence. Much of this issue is covered in Rand's essay "Philosophy: Who Needs It," so I do not think it is necessary to speak of it further.
Considering the advocation Objectivism proper, there are two issues to be stressed: understanding and integrating the principles of Objectivism and arguing effectively. Without having a good grasp of both Objectivism and convincing methods of argumentation, it would be nearly impossible to convince anyone of Objectivism's veracity.
Rand's writings are the primary source of information about Objectivism, but secondary sources (like _Objectivity_) also provide enormous benefit, as does interaction with other Objectivists. Discussion between those who fundamentally agree provides a non-threatening atmosphere and a common context. When arguing with an adversary, an error or lack of evidence is a loss; with allies it is an opportunity for growth. Those who have communicated with other Objectivists can speak to its aid in understanding Objectivism and its personal benefits as well.
The gentle art of persuasion is a skill that many Objectivists desperately need to learn. All too often Objectivists quickly morally condemn those who disagree with them or even substitute moral condemnation for rational argument. David Kelley, Nathaniel Branden, and many others have gone great lengths to reverse this disturbing trend by advocating a more benevolent attitude towards those with whom we disagree. Care must always be taken to remain clearly focussed on the issues being discussed rather than the personalities involved and to express one's passionate certainty benevolently. One must also be prepared to concede error or ignorance in debate. Clinging onto disproven ideas out of false pride immediately destroys the audience's trust in one's rationality and often in one's ideas as well.
Identifying the context of the debate, particularly the environment, is also crucial. Different methods are required for different settings, but the cardinal rule is to avoid provoking hostility or defensiveness. Tim Starr wrote recently:
"Another question to consider is what one's goal is with dissenters: to refute them, or to persuade them. In my experience, refutation of those who disagree with me has never done me much immediate good... Refutation comes more easily to me, but whenever I can stick to persuasion it pays off in spades."
I heartily agree. But because no one can live in a ideological vacuum, simply revealing someone's errors is not enough; they must be presented with a viable alternative. People also need time to not only re-evaluate their old beliefs but also evaluate new ideas. To demand that anyone instantly accept a new set of idea as true is not taking into account the nature of human consciousness.
So how can Objectivists learn how to consistently apply good debating techniques? Debating with other Objectivists (perhaps having one play the devil's advocate), jumping headfirst into a UseNet group and learning by trial and error, utilizing the emailing lists, or even just watching what techniques are effective in convincing others. People like Jimbo Wales, John Enright, and Will Wilkinson (to name a few) have had a profound effect on alt.philosophy.objectivism, the result of which has been a huge increase in the membership of MDOP.
***
One of the primary goals of Objectivism as a loose intellectual movement has always been promoting the study of Objectivism in colleges and universities. The reasons are quite simple. Universities are environments where ideas are deemed important and intellectual investigation is encouraged, at least superficially. Students are at the age when the make decisive choices about the role that ideas will play in their life, and about the specific ideas that will guide their actions. Moreover, most people read and are inspired by _The Fountainhead_ and _Atlas Shrugged_ in high school or college, before having lost the "idealism of youth."
In promoting an intellectual movement on college campuses, two of the most apparent means of fostering the growth of Objectivism are through campus clubs and the internet. (I think that there are more ideas to be had here, so I welcome alternate suggestions).
Campus clubs can be great resources for college students. A good club would be loosely organized, promote conceptual understanding of Objectivism, encourage friendly debate, and help form friendships. But the fact that campus clubs have not been very successful, even declining in membership in recent years, is a signal that these important elements are either non-existent or underemphasized. Especially in college, where the pressure to conform is great and the desire for like-minded friends is extremely important, a loose, friendly gathering of Objectivists and admirers of Rand (even if they disagree on some issues) seems to be the best way to conduct an Objectivist group. With such mutual benevolence established, dealing with others on campus hostile to Rand's ideas would not be so difficult.
But there is another resource available to college students: the internet. It is available to virtually every college student and provides great opportunities for Objectivists to communicate regardless of location (which can be crucial for people who do not have other Objectivists in their vicinity). But because finding other Objectivists on the net who share one's intellectual and personal interests can be difficult, Will Wilkinson, Eric Barnhill, Jimbo Wales, and I have been working on a project to facilitate the establishment of more personal ties between Objectivists, particularly those in college. We are establishing a means by which Objectivists with shared intellectual or personal interests can find each other easily, thus encouraging the three keys to making Objectivism a real intellectual movement again: integration, debate, and friendship. This project has the capacity to grow in accordance with the demand, but for the moment, it will start as an index of Objectivists in school (high school, undergraduate, graduate). You will be hearing more about this project from Will soon.
***
Finally I want to convey a few of my personal sentiments about the meaning of making Objectivism a true intellectual movement again. I was in the library Saturday, looking through all the old issues of _The Objectivist Newsletter_, _The Objectivist_, and _The Ayn Rand Letter_. In the early issues a sense of excitement and efficacy pervaded the writings; implicit in every article was the idea that the philosophy would conquer the world. But, when the conflict exploded with the Brandens, the whole tone changed. Articles were often reactive instead of pro-active; the sense of efficacy disappeared. For example, the "intellectual ammunition" department, a section dedicated to giving people the means to fight for the philosophy, was replaced around this time by the "horror file" department, a pathetic tribute to the fact that the culture was *not* changing. Rand's articles concerning the closing of the _Ayn Rand Letter_ were the most disheartening of all. It was, in essence, a proclamation of her ineffectiveness, of her inability to change the culture that was destroying all that she valued.
I want to see the type of optimism and efficacy that I saw in the pages of _TON_ again. For above all else, it is a belief in the potency of ideas and the capability of Objectivists to change the world that needs to be recaptured. We cannot lose ourselves to condemnations of the "swamp of irrationalism" into which our culture is sinking (according to ARI). We have to remain firm in the belief that ideas matter, that Objectivism matters, and that Objectivists, properly armed with knowledge, debating skills, and the emotional support of friends, *will* change the world.
diana mertz brickell. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Capitalism demands the very best diana mertz brickell of every man - his rationality - dmbri...@artsci.wustl.edu and rewards him accordingly." Washington University -Ayn Rand St-Louis, Missouri ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And here's Paul's reply:
From: Paul Hsieh x3940 Imaging (HSIEH@CSMC.EDU) To: dmbricke@artsci.wustl.edu Date: Apr 25 1994 - 12:59pm
Dear Ms. Diana Brickell,
I read with great interest your recent post on alt.philosophy.objectivism on the topic of intellectual activism. I've been an admirer of Ayn Rand's works for many years, but I have had a difficult time finding other people with whom to discuss her ideas. The friends of mine who have read her works have either not taken much interest in the philosophical implications, or have (IMHO) incompletely understood some of her ideas, making discussion difficult. The limited exposure I had several years ago in college to people from Objectivist groups was not particularly pleasant. I found many of the other Ayn Rand fans to be rigid and dogmatic. Often when I asked what I thought were good-faith questions exploring some of the edges of Objectivism, many of them would become defensive and hostile, substituting insults for reasoned discourse. Also I noticed that a significant minority did not seem *happy* -- i.e, they didn't exude a sense of life indicating that they enjoyed their mental and physical capabilities and were eager to apply them in their daily life. The contrast between them and the various protagonists of Rand's novels was quite striking.
For this reason, I found your vision of an electronic Objectivist community appealing. I only recently discovered the alt.philosophy.objectivism newsgroup, so I don't have any familiarity with participants, recent threads, FAQ's, subjects- to-avoid-lest-they-start-a-flame-war, etc. However, I hope that this (as well as whatever index project you mentioned) can provide a good forum for a collegial interchange of ideas. I, for one, know that there are many issues and implications within Objectivism that I would like to clarify within my own mind, and I would be greatly interested in hearing what others think. I also agree with you that persuasion is a more effective tactic than refutation. I recall the Robert Nozick in his book _Philosophical Explanations_ also deliberately avoided using what he called "coercive philosophy", centered around argumentation, forceful refutations, etc, in favor of an "explanatory approach", where logic and reasoning were used to construct hypotheses as to how things could be (e.g., how was free will possible?). His approach was geared towards gaining *understanding*, and I think that this approach can bear fruit of a different sort than the more tradition coercive approch. (Don't get me wrong -- I love a good, heated philosophical argument as much as the next person, trying to attack weak spots in the other personUs positions, as well as bolstering one's own views with supporting evidence and deductions. But I've found that unless all the participants agree on the ground rules ahead of time, and make a strong conscious effort to stick to logical arguments only, these discussions can quickly degenerate into ad hominem attacks and/or can stray wildly off topic.) More importantly, I also think that the explanatory approach has greater potential to persuade people who have erroneous understandings of Objectivist ideas.
Basically, I would like to find and contribute to a forum where Objectivist ideas could be discussed in a non- threatening environment, to the mutual betterment of all concerned. There are a number of topics that I would find particularly interesting:
1) How can and should Objectivism be applied to various public policy questions (e.g., health care reform, abortion, gun control, etc)? In addition to final goals, what are optimal intermediate tactics?
2) Broader, more theoretical questions about reversing socialistic trends in a mixed economy -- are there times when it is necessary to impose (presumably temporary) greater government controls to correct distortions caused by prior government controls? An analogy that occurs to me is with the field of medicine: Normally it is considered immoral and illegal to plunge a knife into someone's body. However, during extraordinary circumstances (say, an otherwise healthy person has been in a motor vehicle accident and has damaged internal organs), then the appropriate course of action might be *surgery*, i.e, deliberate and skillful violation of the integrity of the patient's physical body in order to correct an abnormal condition. Surgery is not always appropriate. For certain conditions, the most appropriate therapy is conservative therapy -- leave the patient alone and let his or her healing responses deal with the problem. In that case, any surgery would rightfully be considered medical malpractice. However, in other situations, the injury is too great for the body's normal self-correcting mechanisms to cope with alone, and external assistance is necessary. In those cases, if a physician did *not* perform surgery, it would be malpractice. Even so, not all surgeries are appropriate -- some can do more harm than good. And sometimes, even after appropriate surgery, external medical assistance might be necessary on a permanent basis (i.e, a patient who has damaged both kidneys may need lifelong dialysis, if no transplant becomes available).
Are there any legitimate applications of this analogy to the socio-economic circumstances of this country? Is it simply enough to deregulate the economy and let the various self- correcting mechanisms bring about the desired change? Or are there situations where an ideal Objectivist government might need to legitimately maintain temporary (or even permanent) controls on certain portions the economy in response to prior government-caused economic trauma? And if so, how does one decide when and what sort of controls are best for each situation? Even if additional government interventions are *never* theoretically necessary, are there any important universal principles to follow when deregulating an economy -- are some strategies more effective than others?
(I recently posed some of these questions to the alt.philosophy.objectivism newsgroup in the context of a new South African government. However, these questions can clearly also be applied to deregulation in the countries of the former Soviet Union, or even applied to issues in the USA, such as affirmative action).
3) What are some of the Objectivist positions on various classical philosophy problems like the free-will problem, the mind-body problem, and the physical basis of consciousness (including the old chesnut as to whether it is possible to have conscious robots/artificial minds)? What would be the moral implications of creating artificial minds? (I realize that this is a frequently discussed topic in many science-fiction stories, including the TV series StarTrek:The Next Generation, where some scientists wanted to dismantle Data, the sentient artificial life form. What are the Objectivist opinions?)
4) What are some of the Objectivist positions on the theoretical metaphysical questions raised by modern physics (i.e, quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle, Bell's inequality, etc.)
5) Similarly, are there any implications of Godel's theorems that have relevance to Objectivism, which is based on pure application of logic? Are certain statements going to be true, yet unprovable within the Objectivist system? It is my understanding that within mathematics, each Godel statement (true yet unprovable statement) can be used as a branch point for generating alternative schemes of logic. If a proposition P is one of those Godel statements, then one can take the old system of logic and add P as a new axiom to generate an extended system of logic. Or one could instead take [not-P] and add it to the old system to generate a new but different extended system. In either case, both systems will contain no internal contradictions! (Of course, you cannot include both P and [not-P] in the same system!) In mathematical set theory, there are some interesting propositions such as the Continuum Hypothesis which have the property that either it or its negation can be included as axioms, and either way the set theory will still remain self- consistent. (Another example is the Axiom of Choice). Is there any counterpart within Objectivism? If so, what are the implications?
When I've read Leonard Peikoff's writings, he only briefly discussed some of these issues in (4) and (5), and his discussion did not reflect a very good understanding of them. (I assume that he is not a mathematician or a physicist by training.) Are there Objectivists out there with stronger mathematics/science backgrounds that have said anything about this?
Finally, I noticed that you had an e-mail address at the Washington University of St. Louis. I will be moving to St. Louis in July 1994 to join the faculty at the Wash U Medical School (in diagnostic radiology). What is the Objectivist community like at Wash U? Is there a campus organization (or a St. Louis organization)?
Thank you very much for your time. Any observations or comments you have would be greatly appreciated. Until June 20, 1994, I will have an e-mail address at:
hsieh@csmc.edu
Starting sometime in July 1994, my address will change to:
hsieh@mirlink.wustl.edu
(But I don't know exactly when my new address will become active.)
Imaginary Love Children By Diana Hsieh @ 10:52 PM
A best-left-unnamed e-mail correspondent pointed me to this NY Times article in which the director of the Bullitt Foundation is quoted as describing Discovery (an "intelligent design" think tank) as "the institutional love child of Ayn Rand and Jerry Falwell." My correspondent said, "I have no idea what that means." Indeed!
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Sunday, August 21, 2005
Nathaniel Branden's Campaign Against Objective Moral Judgment By Diana Hsieh @ 10:13 PM
For many years, Nathaniel Branden has openly criticized Ayn Rand's approach to moral judgment. Although I've known those criticisms to be wholly unfounded for some time, I never bothered to identify the essence of his warm-and-fuzzy alternative until a few weeks ago. I'm glad I did, since it's worse than I imagined.
So in this post, I will scrutinize Branden's criticisms of the Objectivist view of moral judgment, as well as identify the core of his proposed alternative approach. To do that properly though, I must first set the context by reviewing some critical aspects of the Objectivist virtue of justice. Beware: This post is looooong.
Justice -- defined as "the virtue of judging men's character and conduct objectively and of acting accordingly, granting to each man that which he deserves" -- is a thoroughly egoistic virtue (OPAR 276). Moral judgments are indispensable for the simple reason that the course of our lives substantially depends upon the people with whom we choose to associate. So one business partner might help me make a fortune, while another will ruin my reputation by cheating clients. One friend will delight in backstabbing gossip, while another wouldn't dream of such disloyalty. And one educational foundation will promote your values with your donations, while another will undermine them. To ensure that our pursuits actually promote the values necessary for life and happiness, we must consider the moral characters of the people involved. So as Leonard Peikoff observes in OPAR:
Since morality is concerned with a man's fundamental values, moral judgment enables one to know the essence that actuates him; it identifies the principles shaping his character and conduct. In the Objectivist approach, such judgment penetrates to the root principle, the one covering a man's primary use of his faculty of volition. Moral judgment distinguishes the men who choose to recognize reality from the men who choose to evade it. Such knowledge is necessary on practical grounds, in order to plan one's actions and protect one's interests. If a man is good by the Objectivist standard, if he is rational, honest, productive, then, other things being equal, one can expect to gain values in dealing with him. If a man is evil, however, if he is irrational, dishonest, parasitical, one can expect from such dealing not value, but loss (OPAR 277).
Or, as Ayn Rand writes in "How Does One Lead a Rational Life in an Irrational Society?" in The Virtue of Selfishness: "Moral values are the motive power of a man's actions. By pronouncing moral judgment, one protects the clarity of one's own perception and the rationality of the course one chooses to pursue" (VOS 84-5